Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0d26e6462ea23b19…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

822.0 KB
MD5: ca1389699dcd3379713f891b2e496879 SHA-1: 301bd6855f2b74d429b684a162bbe96e691cb83a SHA-256: 0d26e6462ea23b197cf331221a3b02803574b711ac01942f649a7445d35f26f6
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is a password-encrypted Office document containing an Equation Editor OLE object, a known carrier for exploits. This strongly suggests it is designed to leverage a vulnerability in Equation Editor to achieve arbitrary code execution upon opening.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007+, AES-128)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.