Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0d1d364e916adbfb…

MALICIOUS

PDF

87.0 KB Created: 2021-08-12 07:42:47 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-24
MD5: d1a1da781a7b19d9f9b52fd6a6b5dd43 SHA-1: e87031f07b012036846c1cb8a96205560390103e SHA-256: 0d1d364e916adbfb9306ad200448f5d1cf8dd61a2e51ed50e9c9244ddc2a21f4
234 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF file exhibits multiple indicators of malicious activity, including repeated invisible links designed to trick users into downloading payloads. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent. The embedded links point to compromised CMS uploads and disposable hosting, indicating a phishing or malware distribution campaign. No scripts were extracted, but the PDF structure itself facilitates the attack.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9980

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Invisible/repeated PDF links deliver payload file critical PDF_REPEATED_PAYLOAD_LINK_LURE
    PDF uses invisible link annotations and points to a direct payload download. Repeated invisible links or lure-like payload names such as document/unlock/verify archives match malware-delivery PDF carriers where the page is only a prompt and the real payload is fetched from the linked URL.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://queure.ru/uplcv?utm_term=download+apk+kinemaster+pro+mod+apk.revdl.com In PDF document text
    • http://hzjksj.com/images/upload/File/14587319101.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://goactive.hu/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/9974daae67eb72af695f3a706a89e169/vatodisufesezazet.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://masterpieces-mallorca.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/c75c097e9cf0ed91e2e447ce31bc6d93/lojawerisijajozefetofe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://jmdfhjl.com/fckeditor/userimages/file/27799806275.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://idfusionllc.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f06b79510545ffc6e4ed4f80092b7b05/22859387352.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fobiy.net/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f1baafb3eed372999de9e14f55feb2bf/28225902584.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gulertrafik.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/k7hhl1ns69ih9e6qoo8kdiubfc/dorisugepokividulujuvi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://careersourceokaloosawalton.com/files/public/84990269603.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dataction.org/demo/dataction/media/boxiwasatejud.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gresathouse.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/fb029f1a394d33d5f85f35dfd6440532/jefukebitifuwarir.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://automotiveenergy.cz/userfiles/file/begumunuretewoziki.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dhf-china.com/d/files/supimelojadesogun.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cakesandcupcakes.net/userfiles/files/31004786414.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://averon.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16072aa602c99f---sigoxitudojigigopomuk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.bountyvacation.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606f98cd83e0e---99953735396.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.idromeccanicasrl.com/idromeccanicasrl.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/169db868d294cc9fe706135d90ad0cec/11723803806.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://freemansphotography.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608dc16c0cd5b---lokokan.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://novussiteyonetimi.com/uploads/file/bunuwolub.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://allycatering.com/userfiles/80660408351.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ulrike-mayer.de/userfiles/files/40052194032.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.virtualaid.eu/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a6f58cad851---xakegelap.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://antansconstructions.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/tuzejebasiximevoxeduvew.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ee09.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEE09 17708 bytes
SHA-256: a3447425876c80d52fded3cd40a180f87aaf597769bfb4d5603e13512a861071
font_01_sfnt_off00011cae.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11CAE 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_02_sfnt_off000134c5.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x134C5 10988 bytes
SHA-256: c2329c1f1b5e4cc0e7ef2a070790a2526196430b7a42d28ec9e2080e7262b7c2

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