Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0ce58b334ef257d8…

MALICIOUS

PDF

77.3 KB Created: 2021-01-14 10:26:50 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-11
MD5: 896da605d6c0c9a407776898b508fc2e SHA-1: bcf12655fb78b1d31413ccd4a8c1b80f03bb5145 SHA-256: 0ce58b334ef257d84c835d73fc2bedea254b06890f432ab27f6baffa8fb6b446
264 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links pointing to various domains, many of which are hosted on disposable or suspicious platforms. This behavior is indicative of a link farm designed to manipulate search engine results or to host phishing lures. The presence of a link to a known malicious redirector further supports this assessment. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the structure and URL patterns strongly suggest malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/123?utm_term=create+columns+in+google+slides In PDF document text
    • https://bafovulik.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070506/lajoko.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1177005.mozfiles.com/files/1177005/dank_chat_apps.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://walegizagoz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775215/d41a89ac.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lanulizuxuja.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134658029/5624958.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://damijuvik.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381376/voredovan_waliwineviwego_monukisarifoso_bomilisu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4455881/normal_5ff106b281fa3.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tatonipek.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134874136/xexake-bolalex.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4389095/normal_5fd5f08f78e5b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ralikinu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134883141/4cd9b6.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/xakelafu/jdjdmWT/39941365417.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4408713/normal_5f957c2f522f2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tajixuxax.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134751877/kunawolubad.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/natefisaka/wKieid4/53051467804.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/wulagisi/cherry_mx_keycaps_mac.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000efc9.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEFC9 5164 bytes
SHA-256: 286f0484ae1979b72c66b93648542741022f17758b8c8a59f9d0249c52eab8fb
font_01_sfnt_off00010134.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10134 11124 bytes
SHA-256: 9d7510485f9aca7635a9c40b0a459e80048cd97dc5097e991f3d827945944a23

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