Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0ce2bc88374d6975…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

724.9 KB Created: 1996-12-17 01:32:42 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: db95e0847ee114aa0702907b06f8ac8b SHA-1: 858d67ead99754b17f0462dc9eac7f646e28fc75 SHA-256: 0ce2bc88374d69751ad3b66eff32ea8c094f3dfa430e5691bff5b5a814c473f8
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The file is an Excel document that triggers a critical heuristic for CVE-2009-3129, indicating an exploit for a known Excel vulnerability. High-severity heuristics for ShellExecute and GetProcAddress suggest the execution of arbitrary code. The large slack space anomaly further points to a malformed structure typical of exploits.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2009-3129 — Excel FEATHEADER record overflow critical CVE exact CVE_2009_3129
    Workbook BIFF stream contains a FEATHEADER (Feature Header) record with anomalous size (record_size=23, isf=2, cbHdrData=4294967295). Legitimate FEATHEADER records are tiny (<100 bytes) and carry cbHdrData values that fit in the record body; the value here is the documented CVE-2009-3129 exploit primitive — cbHdrData drives a memcpy with attacker-controlled size, leading to memory corruption and code execution in Excel 2007/2003.
  • Reference to ShellExecute API high SC_STR_SHELLEXEC
    Reference to ShellExecute API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 742,333 bytes but its declared streams total only 24,565 bytes — 717,768 bytes (97%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Reference to VirtualProtect API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALPROTECT
    Reference to VirtualProtect API
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/iX/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/exif/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/tiff/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://www.iec.ch

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