Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0cce27e377a841ef…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

314.8 KB Created: 2015-06-05 18:19:34 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Excel 16.0300
MD5: 56b624a272d67b51fdaa10e03472e29d SHA-1: 683c52404085f2f6e395feb00d1bf2e7dfd95c53 SHA-256: 0cce27e377a841ef59261c07dc04dac7f3b8b0002f77885d08fa1f3662147339
242 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an Excel document containing obfuscated VBA macros, including a Workbook_Open auto-execution routine. The VBA code attempts to download and execute a second-stage payload from a URL, disguised as a license purchase link. The document body text also contains instructions for purchasing a license and using the macro, further supporting the phishing and malicious macro execution attack pattern.

Heuristics 7

  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • Workbook_Open macro high OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://www.icloud.com/)���������������������������������������������������������
    • https://photopalaces.booth.pm/items/1322274

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
56eee31bc0e9caab8fd339beafd93a2584bf4310f290b06eb63b7db4bc752da8
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 103157 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
769fe629f04701b68f7f30dbcfcf2104b37e91a6fc0067505eb6ad7921aae7d4
vba-project OOXML VBA project: xl/vbaProject.bin 211456 bytes