Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0ccdf179aa040c07…

MALICIOUS

PDF

47.9 KB Created: 2020-08-10 06:24:07 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 036dfb40326a0797f7a3939429a8d53e SHA-1: ba1419c6654bc23393b3583a67259070c96d49ce SHA-256: 0ccdf179aa040c07674c18a1f4d3d4b48d1ed1a1890f46b9f471b4e0c84228b3
194 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous links, including one pointing to known malicious redirector infrastructure at 'ttraff.com'. The document body, though obfuscated, contains text suggesting it is a 'biodata form' and includes URLs that appear to be part of a link farm designed to distribute malicious content. The ML classifier strongly indicates maliciousness, and the presence of multiple external links supports a distribution or redirection attack pattern.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=sample+biodata+form+pdf
    • http://files.interdimensionalufoexperience.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437765/1368816.pdf
    • http://files.cmdg.online/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740464/8411981.pdf
    • http://files.lovejamie.shop/uploads/1/3/2/6/132695190/sukopivogikigi.pdf
    • http://dilibolo.impressivedfw.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453540/e81fc.pdf
    • http://files.mgarrigan.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775342/3f17b6facbd311.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0484/5465/files/48584212786.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/zupapinited.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/5541/5445/files/vafulefigakakizare.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/fadanamimurusekebunom.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0440/3278/6597/files/analytical_method_validation_as_per_ich_guidelines.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/7739/2791/files/10477784792.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/8652/0224/files/dabav.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/3119/7856/files/economist_world_in_2020.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0448/7023/8370/files/casey_at_the_bat_answers.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/6211/7020/files/30680180977.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0536/9758/files/vtech_phone_manual.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/4382/3511/files/40251017433.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006ea7.bin
27d456a86b6f153db63e40bd68c1c1698a103287ac6e195fecc81665004a85ec		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6EA7 4932 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00007f63.bin
9ed04a40b72eceb4950a3208eacc3f2b1be9ecfa296a0778fb24708878abab60		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7F63 10804 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000a40f.bin
1062cd8ddf90f4344fa193b395386d5669df1a952e5759311ca261a71931f361		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xA40F 4324 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.