Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0c9f4716491aab10…

MALICIOUS

PDF

32.8 KB Created: 2020-06-11 15:42:50 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: fc89d5b4afa6e053ec1192b3c9cb76e7 SHA-1: 6274700a0648a0d24dff8bfd2c17fb4b470f22d1 SHA-256: 0c9f4716491aab101ab020185fe008db9680752820747b2d5f734e33363b019c
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of external links, identified by the 'PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM' heuristic, pointing to various domains. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the structure and numerous outbound links suggest an attempt to manipulate search engine results or redirect users to potentially malicious content, aligning with a link farm or SEO spam attack pattern.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 4

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://teachingparents2teach.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130604601/130604601.html#commands+exercises+english
    • http://update-flx.net/uploads/1/3/0/2/130291493/7751495.pdf
    • http://tm.undesirable.us/uploads/1/3/1/4/131452923/8736843.pdf
    • http://paladinbynight.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380612/fa512686f843.pdf
    • http://admin.apollotyresmanchester.co.uk/uploads/1/3/0/2/130289592/lifibe.pdf
    • http://quarterbackdevelopment.com/uploads/1/3/0/5/130588452/dadar.pdf
    • http://hamiltonhomecleaners.ca/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380594/dda4d2899dc6.pdf
    • http://everythingwireless.ca/uploads/1/3/1/6/131636775/venamog_sexajovoxikik.pdf
    • http://marketmovesmatt.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070317/lezakijatefi_lovasamamifiwow.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://kitafolek.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/62817339921.pdf
    • https://nomakegune.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/nodowavofomifulebijunamuf.pdf
    • https://xinirex.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/81788595880.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000554e.bin
4e385b37e6fa1f5fdb1005d3748330f64adb900e8b5de85a8cdb2c2749f4215d
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x554E 10352 bytes