Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0c9bf697ea913a97…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

75.7 KB Created: 2021-02-01 11:16:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 68ced19043e3f6f97fb8b4624f02a8e9 SHA-1: e2975e9f468ce3158c9f7f90decc680a70ae7234 SHA-256: 0c9bf697ea913a97283d559bdd59fe83fef51a5038797dbfc9a8a7835f2968d6
264 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains VBA macros, including an AutoOpen macro, which is designed to execute automatically when the document is opened. The script utilizes the Shell() function and CreateObject to download and execute a second-stage payload. The embedded constants '10.23.31.3.0.29.10.29' and '12.85.51.31.29.0.8.29.14.2.11.14.27.14.51.14.60.21.6.44.65.7.27.14' are likely obfuscated network indicators or payload components.

Heuristics 8

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.8f0f0f0fe0f0f0f0-OOXML-9981534-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.8f0f0f0fe0f0f0f0-OOXML-9981534-0
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
5e47cc64b8e9f3c1c944e63888ac9bc34448f1d5ac737839472cd65adca396ed
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 2054 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
a5013681277ff98cb54c60cdf8f3d79bf75242989f95609bf608e412dfceb732
vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 25600 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 long base64-like blob(s).