Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0c931150e84d9035…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

954.0 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2026-04-20
MD5: bedc0a91e08fd638d369d88fff6d07f3 SHA-1: c099a1fe8facd5b9db13deab11ae80e99da152e4 SHA-256: 0c931150e84d9035b8650b5c69746765e0ac6798c5e06fbe4100f3c1fa4acaf4
172 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an Excel file containing an embedded Equation Editor object that exploits CVE-2017-11882. This object contains a secondary embedded PDF which exhibits suspicious static findings. The VBA macros are present but contain no executable statements, indicating the exploit is likely delivered via the OLE object itself. The primary attack vector is likely spearphishing, with the embedded exploit serving as the execution mechanism.

Heuristics 6

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/g/img/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/illustrator/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://www.iec.ch

Extracted artifacts 8

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
5d33e62568c2f224a69aca440074a0b7a041a0550885f3934dad964b66aa4a74		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD00029C1A/oLE10nAtive 2184 bytes
stream_027_off0002ed5b.bin
b1d3870696b037464d54072ab0c6b02a60531ec979a87ca3c76ba3f09ac802ca		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x2ED5B 457920 bytes
icc_00_off00056af5.icc
2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e		 pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x56AF5 3144 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off00057b87.bin
8b9b49d3bcfcf773b551db446dd8c0b0b9077e2c0780475adbef04da72583906		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x57B87 1764 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001000.pdf
c74eea4f6579c9a1caa625aa4046a962307ea0f0edb9266b176fdc33328c0cc3		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1000 972800 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00018a00.pdf
9e701ea0061d97159655b745fc4ea72572077ca62963ff233c2634f284c03959		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x18A00 876032 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00063200.pdf
dfbf7db6917e31d64d159406e2f9ee0a5c339d67ae5e6ca1fcd2b1b5d9b3f31a		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x63200 570880 bytes

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