Emotet — Office (OLE) malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0c6fcffa32f94044…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

232.8 KB Created: 2020-08-14 21:43:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: 3e914dcd24ffdb77bc3fd1f54f2b411a SHA-1: cad347220f6fb475edbf4e9e917f15cbcb1dab8d SHA-256: 0c6fcffa32f940442fb58d213d0c3d5d4be4bb901c08d5eba592045782a890e0
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample exhibits critical heuristic firings for VBA macros, including a hidden-property command stager and auto-execution via Document_Open. ClamAV detection explicitly identifies it as 'Doc.Downloader.Emotet-9348583-0'. The VBA script uses obfuscated string concatenation and CreateObject calls, typical of Emotet downloaders, to likely fetch and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 7

  • VBA UserForm hidden-property command stager critical OLE_VBA_USERFORM_HIDDEN_COMMAND_STAGER
    VBA auto-exec macro creates a COM object from a decoded variable and reconstructs command text through Split/Join and hidden UserForm properties such as ControlTipText, Tag, Pages, or HelpContextId. This is a high-confidence macro downloader/loader shape seen in the reviewed OLE set, but it is not an Office CVE exploit primitive.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-9348583-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-9348583-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
34c0de223fb155b200470dd74532eb17cc8088993a15437bad69cdda5f3fc0cc
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 7690 bytes