Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0c6c62fd9f21dcd2…

MALICIOUS

PDF

89.7 KB Created: 2021-07-18 16:31:26 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-09-14
MD5: 914cab8c07d7228f515de34f47150c2e SHA-1: ed02bcf4b2c87dde3055dc48a36ca8731058ddc3 SHA-256: 0c6c62fd9f21dcd2596286ee7abac70bfb7771bb66e00fe3258e8068ff8467bc
196 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link

The PDF document contains numerous links, many pointing to disposable hosting or compromised CMS upload directories, indicative of a link farm used for phishing. The 'SE_BRAND_CREDENTIAL_PHISH' heuristic specifically identifies an attempt to impersonate Amazon, with the call-to-action link host not matching the impersonated brand. Although no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and link farm behavior strongly suggest it's designed to redirect users to malicious sites for credential harvesting.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9942

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Brand-impersonation credential phishing lure high SE_BRAND_CREDENTIAL_PHISH
    Document impersonates a well-known consumer brand and uses account-security / verification language ('unusual activity', 'account on hold', 'verify your account') to steer the reader to a credential-harvesting link. Corroborated by: call-to-action link host does not match the impersonated brand: https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/LPIa9PGmDLg/uplcv?utm_term=ntta+exam+questions+and+answers.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://quangcaosms.org/media/ftp/file/38464095230.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://ntpuvoice.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/rigajixizidab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://israel-aliya.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/0ebf2a1e40ee5d8369dd4d704db3585d/mosofapaxafulusa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sinara.org.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16072db7aadfa1---51786582326.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://geology.ie/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c5efd741008---denaxasijedujojugowamodu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mouaumfb.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160819d8049866---88191956298.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.pibmg.com.br/ckfinder/userfiles/files/files/gefim.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tsradviseurs.nl/mailing/images/photo/file/zawidepiguzipitexejuje.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://anapro.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/36888658461.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ketgate.eu/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/84ed70bc3083c2693397b1cbfaa4b8c0/fatuxesobajevugogesa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.gabrielamaciel.net/images/content/file/42274030992.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.popcaffe.it/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/994d729f152afe4b7e5510c3889da4d3/45593107048.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://action-roofing.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/7bb1a687dc34c64e5705e2aab5a7c9f3/besoxavolezinut.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://klingende-zeder.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16086b1e58bed1---ruwexusomuti.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://temple.mo/userfiles/file/32734165725.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kahounova.cz/userfiles/file/2677247154.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.dj-csnl.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ba5989d2a0a---18069913394.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://impactpluslearning.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/juvusijinixepagesur.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wsm.hk/images/uploadfiles/file/10847967369.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lcd96.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/21160c83d239e4638eae6ec1539141b8/51792418929.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://armanetti.com/images/fawutetuke.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://naseeha.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/63833ded3f2f4192b31dbb42bb09027d/84997675300.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ascensionchina.com/userfiles/file/60859199073.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://citywideok.com/clients/75789/File/gevalejamakiregezepanote.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.meglobalinc.co.za/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608c227706774---jejugefuxuxiluxivexopatal.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/LPIa9PGmDLg/uplcv?utm_term=ntta+exam+questions+and+answersPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f9cc.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF9CC 10772 bytes
SHA-256: 9b2ab0cf7085ffff1548fc97ef1a786c4f9048f71dd47f637daec05e6aced9da
font_01_sfnt_off00011272.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11272 17244 bytes
SHA-256: 231a715b288bd8935a638e3d81033f07466783b448e86b19258d7ed44b7e3c6a
font_02_sfnt_off00013fba.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13FBA 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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