Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0c1112be91af3c78…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

65.2 KB
MD5: 3b7e558f25a285b97bce248970e865e7 SHA-1: 288f770d8a3d7175d9863002380f241f76026d84 SHA-256: 0c1112be91af3c782c93a580ee44e540130c295ba1fae0b2156eb2883970ec85
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains multiple indicators of exploiting Microsoft Equation Editor, including OLE object data and automatic linking, which are used to trigger code execution. The embedded OLE object data likely contains a payload that is automatically updated and activated, leading to the execution of a malicious second stage. This pattern is commonly associated with spearphishing attachments designed to exploit software vulnerabilities.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001a1e.bin
4309ffa9113a87358e3b787726d4d2b9341bbd79343af1d2107113d872507305
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1A1E 1466 bytes