Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0c10590a88132c15…

MALICIOUS

PDF

73.7 KB Created: 2021-01-09 15:49:50 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-27
MD5: c7b5efdb11324c78b2ee26147cd8bed7 SHA-1: 79e361341c9f892bc745e98bf00423b1533c79cf SHA-256: 0c10590a88132c150955379ee39ee4266122d60c9ef908b1012f8d4750716863
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file was flagged by multiple heuristics as malicious, including a critical finding for linking to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The ML classifier also assigned a very high probability of maliciousness. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains text related to 'hooked model pdf' and wkhtmltopdf, suggesting a lure. The primary IOC is the malicious redirector URL, which is likely used to funnel victims to phishing sites or further malware.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/123?utm_term=hooked+model+pdf In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4472186/normal_5fb717f66095f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kerumeso.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134641164/9559704.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4467030/normal_5fad5b3e4de24.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bakuwosir.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874569/9765153.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://firerokuk.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164187/4198302.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lodirunesu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874391/1918150.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dotomogef.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134760479/samokej.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4369904/normal_5f95fa420eb4c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4417032/normal_5fd1c1278ee20.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/kujapomib/visajuw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/68eee950-2c19-4485-88b4-64f2f7192e2f/ksp_manual.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c9658491-c617-41df-99eb-2fc2a290671b/togemerinebefotosavez.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/faduxodiwo/pakizixakax.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/d27c1a4f-1098-43ee-9559-cb76325d3568/36138401436.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000dadd.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDADD 4280 bytes
SHA-256: 3425034c4c402fbee50170bd8f69086e291abd4dd8d12a6f23ffa0be042de926
font_01_sfnt_off0000e967.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE967 10144 bytes
SHA-256: 071e69f733d9766f5a14c5379852ff89612725c8e794ce3226aabc260e1667e7
font_02_sfnt_off00010c3b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10C3B 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 1158d95dac44631f497756703988ba3645251422e7ff0015d3fca430225e7c3e

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