Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0bea118f7eec07b3…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

38.0 KB Created: 2015-04-20 18:31:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2018-06-14
MD5: 7d385429fa8ac5fa045ad78acf4280aa SHA-1: f1fea0b17f5ba976b4302781109e29b5f7b26df6 SHA-256: 0bea118f7eec07b3201ec32ac550a02ffce1ba384d7b3ad05f023a155e437263
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File T1129 Execution through API

The document contains an embedded OLE object with indicators of a dropped executable payload, identified as a likely CVE-2026-21514 exploitation attempt. It also includes a lure to enable editing and double-click an icon, a common tactic for malware droppers to bypass security measures. ClamAV detection further confirms its malicious nature as a dropper.

Heuristics 6

  • OOXML Ole10Native with payload/link indicators — possible CVE-2026-21514 high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    Office document contains embedded OLE (word/embeddings/oleObject2.bin) with Ole10Native plus executable, PE, or risky remote-link indicators. This is a likely CVE-2026-21514 exploitation shape.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6582434-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6582434-0
  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject2.bin 16384 bytes
SHA-256: f67798b98843d14e7f0560d272b9ca449d778030d03f3bb425898d65ada18d73
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject2.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 13388 bytes
SHA-256: e6899b564a7a128f98d3469dbe9901f6e1f7635db024f01a1c7a90452286de86
emf_00.emf ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 17536 bytes
SHA-256: a613c81f75ac3414c4b282e245dd3a7574428ff4bed9c6935acd68ba69201a3d