Emotet — Office (OLE) malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0bddf95b8e65f553…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

155.9 KB Created: 2020-09-14 23:20:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: 478acb75ce53b6314ddd608cfe4f3178 SHA-1: 7041fe8d636b5ef1f02bdf3e3495efba6fe70943 SHA-256: 0bddf95b8e65f553f003ab0bb5c52d8a82ad27f4fc1dcaf0b044ec9b9001a563
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a malicious Office document containing a VBA macro. The macro is obfuscated and uses CreateObject to execute a PowerShell stager, as indicated by the OLE_USERFORM_OBFUSCATED_POWERSHELL heuristic. The ClamAV detection name also points to Emotet. The Document_Open macro is designed to automatically execute upon opening the document.

Heuristics 7

  • Hidden UserForm PowerShell EncodedCommand stager critical OLE_USERFORM_OBFUSCATED_POWERSHELL
    OLE document contains a UTF-16LE form/property string with an obfuscated PowerShell -EncodedCommand payload. The observed macro family reconstructs this hidden string with Split/Join or UserForm property reads and launches it through WMI/COM process creation. This is downloader malware, not an Office CVE exploit.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Emotet-9762289-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Emotet-9762289-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
c2c6c828c036fac6100aee871b53e2578aa69d81979ea582439457589bcf0fbb
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 18613 bytes