Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0bd3204d0f9f1341…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.1 KB Created: 2020-11-03 15:06:22 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-14
MD5: 4bcd74febe706da985404231d31cf004 SHA-1: 486a2882f379a00e746d59d45d6b4e822691af17 SHA-256: 0bd3204d0f9f13413aceb5c2bd1f12c13edea2dc1c2140a8524187e2849618de
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to disposable hosting services and redirector infrastructure. The document body text, though partially obfuscated, includes a URL that is also present in the heuristics, indicating a deliberate attempt to direct users to malicious sites. The ML classifier strongly flagged this PDF as malicious, supporting the conclusion that it is designed for malicious redirection.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/strik?keyword=hotel+maintenance+checklist In PDF document text
    • https://fadusoga.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739873/fizaf-jadij.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rewemekekebaz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406535/c6a04.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dupizonax.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380343/9133006.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jiwedizuku.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134310564/zaseronuko_sesipewebezu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nipaxibovaj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379211/tejebabeni-nesevofowafejo-gulufasobeger.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4374376/normal_5f8bd06d557e5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4401714/normal_5f9f5b57c18f9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rirubonoji.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134528367/kipenaripajetesog.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tivakoxidedopa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776298/vesuk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gujodoludota.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681740/55e981990d636.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dutitujazekap.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814390/9276785.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/gofilafixu/63300506157.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/bd6c4264-5ee0-4fea-bc23-056d111fdca2/vogetadadowidaxalimos.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/vidadaviwal/kenya_census_2019.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/f088ffdc-5fc7-4302-8cf2-a143d0dedaa2/nabazosafesaroluka.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000070df.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x70DF 4968 bytes
SHA-256: 6d98148f6e9e6fbe00977e79dddf0d7c6463ef7134116c5e87bc19374dc234ac
font_01_sfnt_off00008193.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8193 10000 bytes
SHA-256: f6f1d3193a332065bba82038b5f37b847e3b6449e3e3e0a458d099c330b19711