Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0ba6ab87145d6759…

MALICIOUS

PDF

82.5 KB Created: 2021-09-09 08:11:34 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: d04c6b14395da60789410cd3a2932f72 SHA-1: eaaa9bc6ec0f3e266130311b705bd15e7c2b7bde SHA-256: 0ba6ab87145d6759d6917116af36e5f10eda594bec8d53916784fa914abba1c4
104 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The ML classifier strongly indicated maliciousness, supported by heuristics identifying the PDF as a link farm pointing to compromised CMS upload storage. Several URLs were extracted, with one specifically hosted on a compromised WordPress site, suggesting a distribution point for malicious content. The presence of a 'download button' lure further supports a phishing or malware delivery attempt.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9960

Heuristics 6

  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://malinaionescu.ro/userfiles/file/sibuwadotivog.pdf
    • http://norilskgu.ru/userfiles/file/motubuwigaxoxiwi.pdf
    • https://fotobolfestmeny.hu/mvc/userfiles/file/2147927337.pdf
    • http://stitesattorney.com/customer/3/d/9/3d947ad6ce2568d98b832ccf5548371bFile/12584724481.pdf
    • http://tokyoto.pl/UserFiles/file/kemufizevisiputidedobubuz.pdf
    • http://www.jcca.co.in/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16133d4d5d6d6c---48692018924.pdf
    • https://aslplastic.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/10126473888.pdf
    • https://trucraftsmanship.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613344a153354---gesesajekakanidaj.pdf
    • http://htk2.altrodesign.eu/ckfinder/userfiles/files/60610127826.pdf
    • http://ducthanhtam.com/uploads/userfiles/file/budixinud.pdf
    • https://polymadeniyaglar.com/fckeditor/userfiles/file/vinojuzu.pdf
    • http://sanchariglobal.com/userfiles/file/gudumukokoroxa.pdf
    • http://www.sbawerribee.com.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16132ef375413c---56667437230.pdf
    • http://skpizzasubs.com/uploads/files/36272530264.pdf
    • http://lunaleo.pl/userfiles/file/jimatovosufetafage.pdf
    • https://kozlovka.mebel18.com/uploads/files/92781466782.pdf
    • http://duz-drustvo.si/uporabnik/file/37552436674.pdf
    • http://citysoupsbellevue.com/uploads/files/lotajozeduzaba.pdf
    • http://ohana1bbq.com/uploads/files/90925540671.pdf
    • https://hometutorsdelhi.com/userfiles/files/zizotokekekepiber.pdf
    • https://olamare.com/img/uploaded/file/28369183551.pdf
    • https://kildevangen.dk/files/tegiludojenizewadesi.pdf
    • https://www.mediawerf.nl/bundles/store24backoffice/ckfinder/userfiles/files/dozesekotejolelude.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/BvfzZFkJO3s/uplcv?utm_term=s8+stock+firmware
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000da79.bin
1c3f200c9c06fb7ebac3bced5e7e70953e521d3a333280fd4e7715d884caaefb
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDA79 18996 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00010c0a.bin
72b044b3fe9a514335bbefb0ec91f9fb20219eb3fa3ab5723f7a9b312d38cb39
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10C0A 10808 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00012516.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12516 16792 bytes