Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0b9954ac9545d256…

MALICIOUS

RTF

228.8 KB
MD5: f0ec4c26119748dfad981ed0958dd241 SHA-1: ff5a7aceae3531d489e2d2775482efc81355b7af SHA-256: 0b9954ac9545d256156dcb173280f21c72af669571169b9eb5078d9a388f5e3a
220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains multiple indicators of OLE object manipulation, specifically related to CVE-2017-8570. This vulnerability allows for the dropping of a script file, which is then likely executed to further compromise the system. The presence of composite monikers and objdata sections strongly suggests this exploit is being leveraged.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) critical CVE related CVE_2017_8570
    RTF \objdata decodes to OLE data containing the Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) CLSID — the vulnerable control/moniker is embedded directly in the document's object stream, the delivery shape of this exploit. RTF objects auto-render when Word opens the file.
  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000007da.bin
407ed3087a8704bbfad5775001ad97c69df861d6cd8a39fdc46ce5886b0c2ff2		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x7DA 20571 bytes
objdata_01_off0000af9f.bin
1af484323aa51f0bc067b498458ed2106db428c7b743185ac9a6e18e7b648e31		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xAF9F 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off0000c542.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xC542 12297 bytes

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