Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0b87a492530ea7a6…

MALICIOUS

RTF

3.5 KB First seen: 2019-01-20
MD5: 59a40af60cf0287f3107f8985ed3a92f SHA-1: fe53cdc06ebc02c26fdd898c533041e5b2108f35 SHA-256: 0b87a492530ea7a6f9aaf91d499758e44e97d3abe5b969e316838ba5ef9986de
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains heuristics indicating the exploitation of the Equation Editor vulnerability, a known method for delivering malicious payloads. The presence of OLE object data and an objupdate directive further supports this. This technique is commonly used in spearphishing attachments to achieve initial execution of malware.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000003c.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3C 1751 bytes
SHA-256: 5bfad3826356de10b823304cbbce62af0897f1ac0f07ace6d55e49e2840844de