Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0b4a7df8fc44f50e…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

150.0 KB Created: 2013-10-28 14:02:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: 1c26823acd1ebc13edbfb543a0b57cc3 SHA-1: b82f613c1f344522761027ce692349b3ffa67b38 SHA-256: 0b4a7df8fc44f50e0c81b5cb177f970add7c7a6929352e91b28366a278ed4702
122 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is a malicious OOXML document containing an embedded OLE object. Heuristics indicate this object is likely an exploit for CVE-2026-21514, designed to drop an executable payload. The document body appears to be a legitimate project description, suggesting the exploit is the primary malicious function.

Heuristics 4

  • OOXML Ole10Native with payload/link indicators — possible CVE-2026-21514 high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    Office document contains embedded OLE (word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin) with Ole10Native plus executable, PE, or risky remote-link indicators. This is a likely CVE-2026-21514 exploitation shape.
  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
c6a72565937a0aa9d3f978ad78a6ec41c125a35dacf98eaf5ca3b4fec6060f65		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject3.bin 81920 bytes
ooxml_oleobject_01.bin
0a945613071a4bdb55601a22a7e6f525bbc6dacb5bc424bceb65c07bc3d071dc		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 45056 bytes
ooxml_oleobject_01_ole10native_00.bin
8b53bfd319a3ad1d0ccb62700e441e934a4a4d24d7fb63ebcfa0cf2098b85dcb		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 41580 bytes

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