Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0b4342bf0e41c2e6…

MALICIOUS

PDF

73.4 KB Created: 2020-11-03 11:17:39 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-15
MD5: 0a89ff4de8d79e08a81a607a7d1be4fb SHA-1: 127d0b1b2b61aa52e705403305a0b16f87b6c038 SHA-256: 0b4342bf0e41c2e644fa530764dbf91ecb23f499c796cdf247f09efc0fb7db1d
184 Risk Score
Tags
free-cdn-ebook-manual-lure

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF file functions as a link farm, containing numerous links to external websites. One of these links, https://cctraff.ru/aws?keyword=myconid+5e+stats, is identified as malicious redirector infrastructure. The document's structure and the presence of multiple links suggest an attempt to lure users to potentially harmful sites, likely for phishing or malware distribution.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/aws?keyword=myconid+5e+stats In PDF document text
    • https://vasedowazapen.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134320052/jagari_somulunezawig.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4369158/normal_5f8f2c5029f00.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wosezobar.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856012/bisikepuro_lerezet.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pudukodup.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407572/bazezopid_lokukojakuzi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vedakevuvapi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134013486/pakaxemixuz-lazolujeb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/0bb409a9-7dcf-4927-9105-d28e46678508/2882716690.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/4b3640a7-c693-489d-bdad-8e56ab6b7e0b/there_is_there_are_worksheets.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/gupuso/nixasikaxagubaxuvaju.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0505/2701/0988/files/romance_trombone_solo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/a206a509-f9f1-4a46-9750-a2a2265ce6e6/4059035620.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/b0f8a2dc-95b3-43f3-912b-370ffca06bc8/lokip.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/065cf248-9ccb-43b8-9abe-783b2de3fa42/85757695197.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e1a4.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE1A4 5036 bytes
SHA-256: 3252873c6c2b5317f1eed66b18280f13b1be256c4a80dc0cd7b0f8b97ce6bc53
font_01_sfnt_off0000f2f7.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF2F7 11124 bytes
SHA-256: 584a0a7f38fc6152f4f27d2d66ad891f71f3604c6f389d6b262af22c76474e0a

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