Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0b2b8aa845190140…

MALICIOUS

RTF

9.9 KB First seen: 2020-05-25
MD5: 4a266108f8b7e5a84cede586aced0a2b SHA-1: 6dcb574eed91a29a1f73baab500c762f890e4564 SHA-256: 0b2b8aa845190140a4a2283b8e49644427e48264282c77cfe1d5cb45e3f90a7e
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains embedded OLE object data and specifically triggers heuristics related to the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate further indicates that the embedded object is designed to be activated, leading to the execution of arbitrary code. This is a common method for delivering malicious payloads via spearphishing attachments.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000009e.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x9E 1949 bytes
SHA-256: d634d44ecd8f265a5e5487c54680d0d852f765052c0dbd44589a42766f7214e6

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