RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · 0b277825df78139d

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

930.1 KB

MD5: 640b0d347a49536c213a6227874205b4 SHA-1: b51e9afb9bf7f55c369b69d5fbaeb11b8d24cc5c SHA-256: 0b277825df78139d46171f324c582866a81252fdaec3c8912fee41fb6f6172e2

182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object exploiting the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). This vulnerability allows for the execution of arbitrary code, which is likely used to download and run a secondary malicious payload. The presence of the Equation Editor OLE object and the associated heuristics strongly indicate this attack vector.

Heuristics 5

Equation Editor OLE1 native payload — CVE-2017-11882 related critical CVE related CVE_2017_11882_RELATED

RTF decodes to an OLE1 Equation.3 embedded object whose native data is large and payload-like, and \objupdate requests automatic activation. This is the delivery shape used by Equation Editor RCE documents such as CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802, but the malformed MTEF record needed for exact attribution was not recovered.
Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001070.bin` `dbdefae6d593538f858dc3c2c6c56dbd21ea7fcc148a9e23d8161ce73eea6323`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1070	473995 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact entropy is 7.99, consistent with packed or encrypted content.

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