RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · 0b20db78098593c0

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

302.5 KB

MD5: 3a1d716b4dfe54f69af8d0995246ac53 SHA-1: 0b6d2a32f139fe354dc8a44c4f348300136a76d4 SHA-256: 0b20db78098593c01a179b62c8686d6fc91be68d990d194e6102cd44fcb51a43

182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains an OLE object associated with CVE-2017-11882, indicating exploitation for client execution. The presence of ` tf_objdata` and ` tf_objupdate` heuristics further confirms the embedding and activation of an OLE object. This technique is commonly used in spearphishing attachments to deliver malicious payloads.

Heuristics 5

Equation Editor OLE1 native payload — CVE-2017-11882 related critical CVE related CVE_2017_11882_RELATED

RTF decodes to an OLE1 Equation.3 embedded object whose native data is large and payload-like, and \objupdate requests automatic activation. This is the delivery shape used by Equation Editor RCE documents such as CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802, but the malformed MTEF record needed for exact attribution was not recovered.
Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001902.bin` `394cbc509cad4f48a522fab903ae04a998beb791625c574df5421461f69ef772`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1902	100880 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.

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