Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0b20d40d91927043…

MALICIOUS

RTF

36.1 KB First seen: 2023-05-18
MD5: 1024edaea952ddfed7ee9067dd266409 SHA-1: 56b86cc12b63201a23ab3926901501f0aa5680d7 SHA-256: 0b20d40d91927043566ec42d1d44c23bc0522e19defcd366c8354b9ea14db68c
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 User Execution: Malicious Link T1059.005 PowerShell T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object and specifically triggers the Equation Editor heuristic, indicating an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability. The presence of a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing' further supports the malicious intent. The primary goal appears to be the execution of a secondary payload, likely via the exploited Equation Editor vulnerability.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00004685.bin
871cc050a72077e97deeea4f1fadf13b8ef4a02172aac9c621e8d28c04af595b
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4685 1323 bytes