Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0b0a1c565d9b5cee…

MALICIOUS

PDF

73.4 KB Created: 2021-02-07 13:10:01 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-04
MD5: 9fc8c773e87725a42279693ebe58e7eb SHA-1: 99710acdc90121d5e32ff18eec977e9150c3dd44 SHA-256: 0b0a1c565d9b5ceeed25afefd80289a6d90eaf5e2476a7806fa5488ecea38761
244 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://yafferge.ru/wb?keyword=cadence%20allegro%20user%20manual%20pdf In PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/nujobuja/YakDhgV/top_up_my_phone_three.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/kutupejotige/ft0jeij/luke_bryan_songs_2013.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4412758/normal_600945ace1657.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xowetigebunagu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131637365/woruwanaruvexojite.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/kigezarokoji/eSgdkhg/55611014639.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/jukusenefow/agQUeih/bounce_house_blower_replacement.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/reruzemafow/N8zgiAd/88396466095.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/mumesimasozo/rzLijWK/98874099901.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jokiputukalak.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164130/mezulomalakokorudof.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4485822/normal_5fce86e1da19f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/kezixowog/ewCig2M/parurepe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/badiboxa/aHjcB9p/potuloberunuketagenogole.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xujoxufopugapes.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380539/vojagibefenipezu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xavimunemu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132815343/xidofixexo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nakaporona.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438848/pufuwaxul-vikasebi-giluti-wamawevuxijamir.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/talexadu/jcLGjj3/tiditefumekebawi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gapefupekud.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871489/jafebizi-kokubibejawovo-tulifow-xunevogagesisas.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zuretajobujab.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131483148/9318323.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e3b2.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE3B2 5380 bytes
SHA-256: fd39a925620bebb1c86ab91ecaec159373de2537bbb18e13b4962fb10e3b1e3b
font_01_sfnt_off0000f5e4.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF5E4 10224 bytes
SHA-256: 192843a2a4631c5ef914d20a62c9bc42b6a8f559c3c597c027c587c167ae6f1d