Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0b06f4036cfeb9be…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.53 MB
MD5: 76d29c28ca7c670367293ca72b21c35a SHA-1: 4572896caccc56875f0223c84348531daa61d827 SHA-256: 0b06f4036cfeb9bebf96463b887c650c40dbde0128800dc8872318b4b13f48f5
242 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The file is an RTF document containing multiple indicators of exploitation, including OLE object data, an Equation Editor CLSID, and excessive hex data suggestive of a hidden payload. The presence of ".objdata" and ".objupdate" directives strongly indicates an attempt to activate embedded OLE objects, likely to trigger the Equation Editor vulnerability. This technique is commonly used to download and execute a secondary malicious payload.

Heuristics 7

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Ole10Native stream in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_OLE10NATIVE_STREAM
    RTF contains an embedded OLE object with an Ole10Native stream. This is a strong payload-container signal and is related to Word/OLE exploit delivery, but it is not specific enough on its own to assign a CVE.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    RTF contains ~1603KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://bit.ly/338GBE3

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000622.bin
0a4cabc06b7149ef9355a4cd4bf3cd1c3962441d79739c9dd6fe6d5e8473c23a		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x622 801872 bytes

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