Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0af1532fcef36e93…

MALICIOUS

PDF

36.4 KB Created: 2020-10-26 00:43:11 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-07
MD5: 9ca8b28e3a4fe0a4d7bbb23a045481a9 SHA-1: 3bb2b81b8f3ba5f4163899506b7c46b6e9a5cc86 SHA-256: 0af1532fcef36e93cef6efedfbdf5fd851fb19d84546906aefd4278f51b77c01
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to disposable hosting and redirector infrastructure. The primary lure appears to be "queen loft bed plans pdf", which directs users to a malicious URL. The ML classifier strongly indicates maliciousness, and the link farm behavior suggests an attempt to distribute malware or engage in phishing.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/aws?keyword=queen+loft+bed+plans+pdf In PDF document text
    • https://dutitujazekap.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814390/jodavegadoran.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zugufavowi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874222/3363941.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rofexigu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738805/sipugixeseranelofi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rokufekajo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814342/e0d1dc6e9a6.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://panidulupeju.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969186/rexuzemufapi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dedeluruxizo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134305162/a08e3a72e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nulejifoxomopik.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437436/sivutet.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://terowibew.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134370771/4447582.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xogexemufak.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437987/aab579b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0493/5742/2751/files/bullet_force_apk_mod_1.46.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/fatisake/43639898427.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/pusolefosex/english_vocabulary_test_with_answers_for_beginners.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9737/5388/files/salamat_full_song_wapking.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0484/9929/4363/files/us_code_of_federal_regulations.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0499/8361/9232/files/bad_value_proposition_design.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0462/3876/1109/files/lupisidezomo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/somamere/60419374084.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/kavitokolezub/2545740329.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000516c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x516C 5140 bytes
SHA-256: 040cbd8fce9e6d6e0c30056bcf803208e2a5fb60c0a832ec392e6f1c64e2115c
font_01_sfnt_off000062f2.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x62F2 9896 bytes
SHA-256: 9cdcbe70f550377e49fe4f3922446a208220ccf0fab952164b33f0c22678dea5

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