Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0af1517df3c4ddaa…

MALICIOUS

PDF

70.5 KB Created: 2021-02-13 19:28:07 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-22
MD5: 073da89d4155e652ef05a637d796bff6 SHA-1: 382710dc96cfcb8034b40daad9ddce56d14715d8 SHA-256: 0af1517df3c4ddaafa0d8f47c7ea9899054d6302005cb0460a4184f32a5da7c6
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous embedded links, with at least one pointing to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely for phishing or malware distribution. Although no scripts were extracted, the presence of multiple links to disposable domains and a malicious redirector suggests an attempt to lead the user to a compromised or malicious site.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://yafferge.ru/123?utm_term=rogue+lawyer+tueble In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4446921/normal_6021c5cd5761c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4370304/normal_5fe24fc51b3f7.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4373271/normal_5ff0327c88470.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ledojekukifal.iblogger.org/54149328355.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4384167/normal_60103bdedc3ae.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://abanca-electronica.com/aruba_215_access_point_manualouf14.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vejenov.iblogger.org/driver_asus_x555qg_amd_a10.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sewototenovaro.iblogger.org/94115939957.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4464302/normal_600bf70b62305.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://roruxarese.rf.gd/california_overtime_policy_template.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://biguwaximi.epizy.com/capture_one_pro_film_styles.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pubitawiwinas.rf.gd/beavers_uniform_badges_england.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wuwedutukuw.epizy.com/78365150266.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://jolasesiv.epizy.com/kuxajoko.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tabifewegijip.epizy.com/3741482715.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fasajixibapa.epizy.com/36530363915.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/forupokisip/69626912377.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/gowebabuxogiro/40714239691.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d834.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD834 5016 bytes
SHA-256: 18eb74a44a859180403e1d8248c5f6e4765f5ac14324942f0d6a35f297e228b8
font_01_sfnt_off0000e974.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE974 10500 bytes
SHA-256: 72e34d032022d9ebf44a27b93421317d76c4510df6534eaec2dbeacdee18ae38

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.