Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0ae6479c845dcf31…

MALICIOUS

PDF

59.5 KB Created: 2020-08-09 22:51:25 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 58d366bdf393ee5304a367b854745ca6 SHA-1: 165072f59be2e9f76086c300deaf40aa6a241f4f SHA-256: 0ae6479c845dcf3188284be8179b167c7b62707e8a2ed6e7f046dea38e9bafe5
194 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a lure related to improving self-esteem, but its primary function is to redirect users to a malicious URL (ttraff.com). This is supported by the PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK and PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM heuristics, indicating a link farm designed to distribute malicious content. The SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE heuristic suggests a common tactic to bypass security gateways by encrypting a payload, which is then likely delivered via the linked PDFs.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=como+subir+el+autoestima+pdf
    • http://files.strawberryflats.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131164558/fujuv.pdf
    • http://files.shcdesignsllc.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740488/bofobiraje_pusufejusuvewor_sejugef_sokolej.pdf
    • http://files.gaggiadirect.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776401/samevojaxibeme.pdf
    • http://files.jaymcclellan.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132683137/lenarusofujo.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/5713/5257/files/78871477330.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/zevimija.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/3273/1038/files/73259982683.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/8482/3205/files/water_pollution_definition_causes_effects_and_prevention.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/6581/8782/files/44082139979.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/0840/9250/files/how_to_enable_chrome_viewer_2017.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/0179/1132/files/78072781663.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/8260/4963/files/53511862106.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/5650/4744/files/tolimefadejita.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/0610/7552/files/ragakipad.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000a0a8.bin
c62724c606c48f876382e72176aea5fd6954d26b4ddb9c671ac094cd8a2926af		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xA0A8 5232 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000b248.bin
a36eee06fef6ce219692c4ec918276ac99413e4fd1e3666e4031624f9289d620		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB248 1800 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000bad5.bin
aa5876c26c62cb8455d17d388a69fc4b5779458a52ff023b04bb7d2ab65fd157		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xBAD5 11252 bytes

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