Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0ade21301934d87d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

45.6 KB Created: 2020-08-12 18:47:10 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: a0a8a8856154388e8347dd64d77cceeb SHA-1: 65d60740ce517fb49182f6854c8634aa6b6453b5 SHA-256: 0ade21301934d87dcf7afb00bff31d2211d84ae7c3ced711067f7b67f5b009a9
194 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous embedded links, with a critical heuristic firing indicating a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The document body, though partially corrupted, contains text that appears to be a lure for educational content, combined with metadata suggesting it was generated by wkhtmltopdf. The presence of a password-protected archive lure heuristic suggests the PDF is intended to facilitate the delivery of a malicious payload, likely through a multi-stage process.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/pify?keyword=ejercicios+numeros+primos+y+compuestos+pdf
    • http://files.winonachurchofchrist.org/uploads/1/3/1/3/131384401/fododexiretu.pdf
    • http://files.alivewhy.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131410606/doxibozoxo.pdf
    • http://files.oma-cob.org/uploads/1/3/1/4/131452935/rubumekilifanusozu.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/8207/2732/files/suvimevetoxowuwogikutone.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0445/8453/4180/files/bocio_coloide_nodular.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/8768/1952/files/golerizi.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/5452/8677/files/pebejimakozunikojukefufi.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/4437/1613/files/exerccios_tabela_peridica_9_ano.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/8706/9335/files/90347112794.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/46676539889.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/6429/4557/files/xitezazitatote.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/8448/8607/files/best_english_books_for_beginners.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/1223/5174/files/sawotowinanaw.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005f0a.bin
8461eafd216f56c93c9279fd73c960ae9205fe2a477009f254a3f35b570e8b15		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5F0A 5192 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000070b1.bin
327dbb09256a1ae946c019957b32aa13550d417b220c3d0e56ac99eb5872164f		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x70B1 10636 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00009375.bin
531e37f64a2e7dc3bfb257675d9e6c644c7b1597f33ba9a969cd005a7ed65660		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9375 16312 bytes

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