MALICIOUS
504
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
T1059.007 JavaScript
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
The PDF contains a JavaScript action that triggers a launch action, executing cmd.exe. This action is designed to export an embedded file named 'MSF_final.pdf', which is detected as a Windows executable by ClamAV. The embedded executable is likely a second-stage payload, and the overall behavior is consistent with a malicious document dropper. The presence of suspicious URLs further supports the malicious intent.
Machine Learning
- Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9747
Heuristics 13
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Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
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Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCHPDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
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/Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMANDPDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\MSF_final.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
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Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCHAn /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
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ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
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ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAVClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
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/Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JSPDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
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Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LUREDocument tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
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JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPTPDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Embedded JS stream low PDF_JSPDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDEDPDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
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Optional Content Group with action trigger low PDF_OPTIONAL_CONTENTOptional Content Group (layer) co-occurs with an action trigger — content can be selectively hidden from viewers or scanners while the action still fires on open
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://evil-site.com/file.html
- http://10.10.11.10:80/file.pls
- http://www.zeustech.net/
- http://]hostname[:port]/path
- http://metasploit.com/opcodedb/
- http://metasploit.com/shellcode/
- http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdfx/1.3/
- http://www.apache.org/
- http://www.iec.ch
Extracted artifacts 9
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
MSF_final.pdf58da107c00e3d9d2eb036ca4c1155bafc45390753f22b796678904f434cc06ac |
pdf-embedded-file | PDF EmbeddedFile object 2889 at offset 0xF749B | 73802 bytes |
|
Detection
ClamAV:
Win.Trojan.Swrort-5710536-0
Obfuscation or payload:
unlikely
|
|||
javascript_obj2890_000.js6b200d4cca3827cc151ab3a6af92d3346b52f06a74136cfb7212e07f10196bb4 |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 2890 at offset 0x102053 | 58 bytes |
stream_008_off00003221.binb3bee5a23447b445107248c454308625363e6fa7d59fc8918c47c898c32441e7 |
decompressed-pdf-stream | PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x3221 | 325080 bytes |
icc_00_off000013f1.icc2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e |
pdf-icc-profile | PDF ICC profile at offset 0x13F1 | 3144 bytes |
font_00_sfnt_off000d0103.bin43d2ed1466d6217ee2a77f58c3150e62a01398c825349b42c61d028a21d647df |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD0103 | 6588 bytes |
font_01_sfnt_off000d1949.bin5a33d0a0bccf487db08c88e3e77f2fa5d218c6e8667d3ce9feb6ae81e29c7d11 |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD1949 | 24712 bytes |
font_02_sfnt_off000d5137.bin8c14450f751c09e5a3f64556e3e4bcbf802a1fc6ca05bbefe5dff9389948e3b1 |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD5137 | 14052 bytes |
font_03_sfnt_off000d7092.binf780fc8adb84294aceb41ef9a2ea4fda40c00d235224893d0cc2beb9a7fbbfc1 |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD7092 | 24260 bytes |
font_04_sfnt_off000da905.bin11d2c6bf895931ae048a618042d773a40dc9e9ec3ab72317d2a5ec124c553538 |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDA905 | 12128 bytes |
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