Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0aca8be1a9f5a0b6…

MALICIOUS

PDF

39.1 KB Created: 2020-06-08 11:16:04 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 28f8cde39461ab9cae70307f7d35c43d SHA-1: 4c6d18a8867d5550c0799d5de682be9109d8a051 SHA-256: 0aca8be1a9f5a0b66393268d1133a59d5468ba75d195a05bcc13a051e0bef466
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF document contains a significant number of embedded external links, identified by the PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM heuristic. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains references to URLs that are also listed in the extracted URLs. This suggests a tactic to redirect users to potentially malicious websites, possibly for phishing or malware distribution. No scripts were extracted, but the presence of numerous external links points towards a social engineering or SEO poisoning attack vector.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 4

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://daytonacondosandhomes.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453907/131453907.html#diep+io+masterov
    • http://ouhuayulechengmianfeishiwan.br3h.com/uploads/1/3/0/2/130288522/4984956.pdf
    • http://brienmccrea.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873902/db7b8999.pdf
    • http://basikglow.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130620410/xujejike.pdf
    • http://pasaporte.me/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437385/a546097.pdf
    • http://pittsburghhairsalons.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856277/komijivetopodit-semafo-zevuzefolav.pdf
    • http://lucaligorio.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813642/8716ee2d994.pdf
    • http://ohio-dogbite.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131455734/virexad-fusexo-ximusinu-kilodujur.pdf
    • http://logical-layouts.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131484268/sumubogomagi.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://fobigimi.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/80930462519.pdf
    • https://tokisize.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/woninukesuvumomu.pdf
    • https://wowewuso.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/judiwukozisizusop.pdf
    • https://rikakuxez132613470.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/somarokalivufumipajelebo.pdf
    • https://tejuluxotaso.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/sekufoxusekodibowuwuwaz.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006022.bin
c2e0d255d932e34b14c42211ad9489baf24e3da9be3746793f07f7610077fe17		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6022 15496 bytes

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