Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0ac0a707877a498a…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.06 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-02-08
MD5: 4817ca18b70c14360ea79b5ec8fdd904 SHA-1: 97712d919e3bf8cd98ce1478fc15a92674865c10 SHA-256: 0ac0a707877a498a57174c2aec59809729f18604707dd178957ca8f2e44d2bad
110 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is an Excel file containing an embedded Equation Editor OLE object. Static analysis identified a critical vulnerability, CVE-2017-11882, associated with this object, indicating it's likely used for exploitation. No VBA macros were found to be executable, and the document body is generic sheet names, suggesting the primary malicious function relies on the Equation Editor exploit. The exploit likely leads to the execution of a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
33af3b5356cbb08dce10d15dc5c2f476fca820314f3c5b6013f6e3d98c4c9002
ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD01DB2D63/oLE10NAtIVE 1545 bytes