Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0abd61f4587f88b5…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

450.0 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-03-10
MD5: fc35c9f1a3267202f5a4b5251a46b39d SHA-1: 5910421d966d128e23e41f8dde8b569dde0a2771 SHA-256: 0abd61f4587f88b5b14da997ca9769fb71b23a41dbf2ba85539b0414b8f8ec1b
70 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The critical heuristic firing indicates exploitation of CVE-2017-0199 via an OLE2Link object pointing to a remote URL. This technique is commonly used to download and execute a second-stage payload. The embedded URL, http://yyyyyYYYYUUSUUUUUUU3243242UUU23U423U4UU2UWW00000000000000000000000@167.114.163.232/ws....................ws.doc, is the primary indicator of compromise. No VBA macros were found to be executable, but the OLE structure itself facilitated the exploit.

Heuristics 3

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://yyyyyYYYYUUSUUUUUUU3243242UUU23U423U4UU2UWW00000000000000000000000@167.114.163.232/ws....................ws.doc

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes