Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0ab34e426e7a87c2…

MALICIOUS

PDF

78.8 KB Created: 2021-03-01 13:45:21 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-12
MD5: aedbd55bbb52b9ef7117e843b4bd6b1d SHA-1: a903313ff665eeebaa5ff9da33c5066725982248 SHA-256: 0ab34e426e7a87c2e9a7fccb95846c2619e24f08a1d27b47808b0e9cf130bdc1
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a significant number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm designed to obscure the ultimate destination. The presence of a URL with 'hp+deskjet+6540+driver+download' in the utm_term parameter indicates a lure for users seeking specific software. ClamAV and ML classifiers strongly indicate maliciousness, consistent with a phishing or malware distribution scheme.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://soxebez.ru/strik?utm_term=hp+deskjet+6540+driver+download PDF link annotation
    • https://pukejuzim.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134457080/1440012.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/gobajejuz/EZidjiq/ultimate_epic_battle_simulator_descargar_2020.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/tutabalero/hchj5hi/lopuso.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/duxafanuke/dHjalhe/67468928435.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zigamebujadosa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134745820/7563172.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zuwanefo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134040462/xidatidazi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/goworonol/Y40gghh/20099666214.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/masamiwe/jfig4ha/download_game_monster_truck_destruction_mod_apk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://phrensy.co/apple_ipod_nano_power_button_stuckojzv4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nozirokopen.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134613575/d7db8.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/joraxeneli/gi5ihjd/vusufimevatiwugudadoze.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://copyright-help-report.com/blockchain_revolution_tapscottwy5sc.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/bizujutenifo/ckgfidr/faxojilulutupugosegiwaz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/wodelaganav/cd21x5Y/92226239701.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/rufopunuk/Ohdhbih/96259603513.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/nixafusoda/dMED5gc/46332973131.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • http://muguvap.epizy.com/51512475278.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nifekubipaxo.epizy.com/waxipasubopoj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e9cf.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE9CF 5504 bytes
SHA-256: 70559bcde6884c95cfe91842203efc04eec487a882a8f6e1e70f583a9581668a
font_01_sfnt_off0000fcb3.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFCB3 10360 bytes
SHA-256: 3cfd52e0e836153786cab0650d10f2b72f9bca2317192c4b3db0488cf66c8f92
font_02_sfnt_off00011fec.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11FEC 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 1062cd8ddf90f4344fa193b395386d5669df1a952e5759311ca261a71931f361

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