Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0ab0c665df3eb357…

MALICIOUS

PDF

54.3 KB Created: 2020-10-15 18:31:21 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-15
MD5: 50fed44bee7dcef1c0e4f29aae18563a SHA-1: e21365acb3ec0a3a0a77027a183b6ff643b4a9e5 SHA-256: 0ab0c665df3eb357a6e44760ea8e2561a41cd7bc92ea56128298701d372cfbba
184 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/123?keyword=galaxy+reavers+hack+apk In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4365546/normal_5f8752f77fc8c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366034/normal_5f87e550a7816.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366044/normal_5f8728c26856e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4365628/normal_5f875e771afd5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jatorogerujew.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132710569/8c3f11ed.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://punadojum.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132680976/1598612.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kasukironumasex.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131454791/6713010.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wefejakero.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814310/8145293.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vuxozajuje.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379873/8554420.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1044012.mozfiles.com/files/1044012/zinuzivemajinukadetilusi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1043495.mozfiles.com/files/1043495/30452378563.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1038317.mozfiles.com/files/1038317/65489224836.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jatorogerujew.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132710569/09b03b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sepikupi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738949/9b0c34.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/f2baca9a-cc4f-4b49-99c4-167420df8694/76762965065.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0497/9625/1810/files/40390960392.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0481/5077/3909/files/25753702406.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/4449/4750/files/vikatofixubuxigu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006cc0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6CC0 2880 bytes
SHA-256: 619a44e8b5c2a2d3fc0e18259d8022938ad4f8b30552901bc68dc41c3d0f2ef0
font_01_sfnt_off000076fe.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x76FE 5344 bytes
SHA-256: f740d1714f3096c752d60d273d2e63fe3885b2b1f2a8e95c046c51d63151e897
font_02_sfnt_off00008937.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8937 14264 bytes
SHA-256: 1a13edf2ee3828855d9d007961e5f5a2307bd387323ec09e116d5dcb1c00d284
font_03_sfnt_off0000b5d2.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB5D2 16160 bytes
SHA-256: 53c3ec829963ec5a0af1bff4be2d724acb9959b277e5253d769434e6be684fe1

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