Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0aa79754e87f6f27…

MALICIOUS

RTF

366.8 KB Created: 2019-11-04 23:55:00 First seen: 2020-06-01
MD5: 09d8e4e3efe65647a9e52520608b10b9 SHA-1: 379abf729b92279d1eba7f51d702f69ab6644fa4 SHA-256: 0aa79754e87f6f2797c8e42e5216bbf6d9e579058e786586b5f8dd12db1d1828
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains critical heuristic firings for CVE-2017-8759, indicating exploitation of MSXML SAX OLE activation. It also contains embedded OLE objects and an ".objupdate" directive, which forces OLE activation. These factors strongly suggest the file is designed to execute malicious code via the embedded object, likely delivered as a spearphishing attachment.

Heuristics 6

  • Equation Editor CLSID critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml In RTF body
    • http://bit.ly/2OijbFAIn RTF body

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0004f608.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4F608 23647 bytes
SHA-256: 781ec18f5bb102312ec21d9538d3a5b1d35671e1891830bb668172690cfa62b0

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