Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0a83a66a638007b4…

MALICIOUS

RTF

91.6 KB First seen: 2024-07-21
MD5: 034e661a8a618c2a1596205d982f769d SHA-1: 181667161e04c2b4336706a09567975979388ce4 SHA-256: 0a83a66a638007b4d23dbe6c6a766ac1c95dc80fcbd7adc4b6f81ec8b3a50885
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 Malicious Link

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability. The \objupdate directive suggests that the OLE object is automatically activated upon opening the document. This is a common delivery mechanism for malware, likely intended to download and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001626.bin
0624662ecdbaaf6d7b3029bf6f6371d9e37d0d54055194fbb42ceab74a465937
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1626 1682 bytes