Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0a7d6759687b2157…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

19.6 KB
MD5: 3082737589a041565ecec958bd8cc33b SHA-1: 838b399b009d585987a09a177d59d0a55fc27f51 SHA-256: 0a7d6759687b215769363084f2311c87891891b3ea80c0c3c6fb7dc85429dfc5
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability, indicating an attempt to exploit client execution. The ".objupdate" directive further suggests that the embedded object is intended to be activated automatically. This is a common technique for delivering secondary payloads, though no specific payload or C2 infrastructure was directly observed in this static analysis.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000020bf.bin
ad71bab1a49b06250ae03919cd2e3df2f2544a6321ec9bb573547ac107e3abef
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x20BF 1511 bytes