Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0a78e8b4519fb59c…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

252.8 KB Created: 2021-01-26 16:49:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: dbf99aac804250a87f9dbccd4961ee87 SHA-1: 03aae020fac88fcbad23eff5d1f560d11e71ef9c SHA-256: 0a78e8b4519fb59cfc3b25a6b62fe0cee2311296a2839eb9360ba44f86206555
84 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1137.001 Office Installation: DLL Search Order Hijacking

The sample is a malicious Office document containing an embedded OLE object. This object is identified as a package that drops an auto-executable payload, specifically a JAR file. The presence of an embedded OLE object and the nature of the dropped payload strongly suggest an attempt to deliver a secondary stage malware. The document itself does not contain user-readable content, but the heuristics indicate a malicious intent to execute an embedded file.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
643994a8b7f7a3b2f0143640733f6dfad1587fcb1bd00bfc2de0c7bdec44249d
ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 245248 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.98, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
55ee08969e1751552e749f236f22a01938b96c0ac4cbf872953ba46495eb0246
ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 240776 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
8982746092702f50fb733b01ea2afdd69d38cb7b9ac7ff379f0dc5aba1558680
ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5148 bytes