Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0a78ce9bbe4e08e6…

MALICIOUS

PDF

13.2 KB Authoring application: Python PDF Library 055 http072057057pybrary056net057pyPdf057
MD5: 6be405429d9c3990e3ba738e7485e936 SHA-1: 077da3ec94552292e9b34fa2a37eec7c3a5fa9a2 SHA-256: 0a78ce9bbe4e08e61e88d0e7347a6100d48b45fdd755b73171a2b7b6dcaedbd4
156 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF document contains embedded SWF content that exploits CVE-2010-1297, a known vulnerability in Adobe Flash Player, to achieve client-side execution. The presence of JavaScript actions and embedded files further supports the malicious nature of the document, likely intended to deliver a second-stage payload. The ML classifier strongly indicates maliciousness.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • Adobe Flash authplay SWF exploit in PDF — CVE-2010-1297 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_1297_FLASH_RICHMEDIA
    PDF combines RichMedia Flash activation, a crafted SWF with ActionScript prototype/AVM-era markers or the AES-PHP/authplay variant markers, and PDF-side shellcode heap-spray staging. This is the static delivery shape associated with CVE-2010-1297 in Adobe Reader's bundled authplay.dll.
  • RichMedia (Flash) high PDF_RICHMEDIA
    PDF contains /RichMedia (Adobe Flash) which is a historic exploit vector
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://adobe.com/AS3/2006/builtin

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
sploit.swf
70e6dbce3b11aaece2d38f1d315dee7736c7ab9138a74cdadc8126393c857018
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0x107F 781 bytes