Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0a4f3f40247a8e40…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

5.0 KB
MD5: 3313d586b158799c6f833a8d4207bd1e SHA-1: 0c59fcb24f485eedb006e0fb25d0083623229ad3 SHA-256: 0a4f3f40247a8e40bf2edb51444b179a21c70642e9c6d6553351e1af7e030895
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability through the Equation Editor. This exploit allows for arbitrary code execution upon opening the document, indicating a malicious intent to compromise the user's system.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000c2.bin
93fd0ad04820367c7149c6b9af1ec7fd6bf29a6e51a34ce50a1a5bc269d8dd7a
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xC2 2283 bytes