Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 0a3ad2928e75944c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

84.6 KB Created: 2021-06-28 20:20:58 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-05
MD5: 27654ce055e54e288f3c6154a5b74531 SHA-1: ac73af75b6fc605baa2136c01788fbb9a7f9dc44 SHA-256: 0a3ad2928e75944ca4781fbde645ffd17df0eb6ba32cee8922a27c71d37b3507
264 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF file is identified as malicious by ML classifiers and ClamAV, exhibiting characteristics of a phishing lure. It impersonates Microsoft and directs users to click a link hosted on compromised WordPress upload storage, likely to harvest credentials. The document body is heavily obfuscated, but the presence of embedded URLs and heuristics related to link farms and phishing strongly indicate malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9964

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Recovery secret / private key request critical SE_SECRET_RECOVERY_LURE
    Document requests recovery phrases, private keys, backup codes, or saved passwords. Requests for these secrets in a document are high-risk.
  • Brand-impersonation credential phishing lure high SE_BRAND_CREDENTIAL_PHISH
    Document impersonates a well-known consumer brand and uses account-security / verification language ('unusual activity', 'account on hold', 'verify your account') to steer the reader to a credential-harvesting link. Corroborated by: call-to-action link host does not match the impersonated brand: https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/6naE_Nh8_CY/uplcv?utm_term=how+to+add+digital+signature.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://www.costaverde.it/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16085045d2e2d0---90694476187.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://noks.cz/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16082bd0b5be22---81373450669.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://famcareconnect.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160d0c742d26cb---dagamolufakilogati.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://hillsclinic.com/fckeditor/editor/filemanager/connectors/php/userfiles/file/dosanofumaxi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://personalloan2u.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/59349a97a8ca7a2b00468eb41e714d66/51540205131.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.1000ena.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609452cd34cf0---89757618315.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kimtuong.vn/isc/public/files/fckupload/file/52406624426.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://cn-daomeng.com/upload/userfiles/files/61b261cffdb03631ffc8a167e6a84d71.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fizjoactiv.eu/Upload/file/59039388637.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bawaconstructions.com/editorData/file/woxizogovemijux.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://automotiveenergy.cz/userfiles/file/lepasiripivogo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bluetact.com/locktactyuma/userfiles/file/roxodopeduzufopogawelufo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://hsegroup.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/r48cubeijh6i8ek87v7i1ioep3/kuxejatimogamug.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://georgiamusicpartners.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/4fa9fc8a393418605bf30c843434fcbc/10232471210.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://discoveryenglish.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a45b93e3db1---53819462052.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://cathugo.de/res/wysiwyg/file/21040335116.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://thanhlamresort.vn/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c07cd03fc37---50044320952.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kaptenhoki.info/contents//files/papomudolovukoravipuwapa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://geology.ie/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160aba515df7a3---kitumoxudapomufibepeluxe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ideatity.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/lijesugibot.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://stratasphere.online/userfiles/file/57422424988.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://friluftsgruppen.se/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160d01aa82f18b---21932687752.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/6naE_Nh8_CY/uplcv?utm_term=how+to+add+digital+signaturePDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e82e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE82E 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off00010045.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10045 10600 bytes
SHA-256: 0c9510ebfea042cb45e0e18bd2faa78e9b5a23853240c9cc588d4def04ba99b0
font_02_sfnt_off0001186d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1186D 17136 bytes
SHA-256: 5f0fe821d941b8904f5b8ccb236342c9cc7f7c559fd919b554e4bc89b29ce17c

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